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ABSTRACT
With the advancements in mobile technology, smartphones have become
ubiquitous in people's daily lives and have greatly facilitated users in many
aspects. For a smartphone user, power saving and privacy protection are two
important issues that matter and draw serious attentions from research
communities. In this dissertation, we present our studies on some specific
issues of power saving and privacy protection on a smartphone.
Although IEEE 802.11 standards provide Power Save Mode (PSM) to help
mobile devices conserve energy, PSM fails to bring expected benefits in many
real scenarios. We define an energy conserving model to describe the general
PSM traffic contention problem, and propose a solution called HPSM to address
one specific case, in which multiple PSM clients associate to a single AP. In
HPSM, we first use a basic sociological concept to define the richness of a PSM
client based on the link resource it consumes. Then we separate these poor
PSM clients from rich PSM clients in terms of link resource consumption, and
favor the former to save power when they face PSM transmission contention.
Our evaluations show that HPSM can help the poor PSM clients effectively save
power while only slightly degrading the rich's performance in comparison to the
existing PSM solutions.
Traditional user authentication methods using passcode or finger movement on
smartphones are vulnerable to shoulder surfing attack, smudge attack, and
keylogger attack. These attacks are able to infer a passcode based on the
information collection of user's finger movement or tapping input. As an
alternative user authentication approach, eye tracking can reduce the risk of
suffering those attacks effectively because no hand input is required. We
propose a new eye tracking method for user authentication on a smartphone. It
utilizes the smartphone's front camera to capture a user's eye movement
trajectories which are used as the input of user authentication. No special
hardware or calibration process is needed. We develop a prototype and
evaluate its effectiveness on an Android smartphone. Our evaluation results
show that the proposed eye tracking technique achieves very high accuracy in
user authentication.
While LBS-based apps facilitate users in many application scenarios, they raise
concerns on the breach of privacy related to location access. We perform the
first measurement of this background action on the Google app market. Our
investigation demonstrates that many popular apps conduct location access in
background within short intervals. This enables these apps to collect a user's
location trace, from which the important personal information, Points of Interest
(PoIs), can be recognized. We further extract a user's movement pattern from
the PoIs, and utilize it to measure the potential privacy breach. The
measurement results also show that using the combination of movement pattern
related metrics and the other PoI related metrics can help detect the privacy
breach in an earlier manner than using either one of them alone. We then
propose a preliminary solution to properly handle these location requests from
background.
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AN INVESTIGATION OF POWER SAVING AND PRIVACY
PROTECTION ON SMARTPHONES

Chapter 1

Introduction
To date, smartphones have been widely used all over the world. As the most
popular portable device, the computing and storage capabilities of a smartphone
have been significantly increased with the hardware advancements in the past
decade. Moreover, equipped with high resolution camera, GPS, and a set of
sensors, smartphones are able to provide a variety of services and applications
to users besides communications. Thus, smartphones not only facilitates users
in their daily lives, but impacts and changes their life styles in many aspects.
As a smartphone becomes ubiquitous in people’s daily lives, some problems
appearing in applications start to draw users’ attentions and concerns. One problem is that the device runs out of power too fast. The capability of computing
is increasing, while the growth of battery capacity does not catch up with its increase trend. Energy efficiency becomes one of the most important factor that
affects user experience. A WiFi component could drain up the battery in a quick
manner, so improving the power efficiency of the WiFi component can well alleviate such a problem. Another problem is about privacy leakage. A smartphone
contains too much personal information, some of which might be sensitive. However, the current defense schemes cannot protect a user’s privacy well, especially
when we are facing the challenges from emerging attacks.
In this dissertation, we investigate the issues about power saving and privacy
protection on smartphone. Specifically, we first take an in-depth study on the
contention problem that impacts the performance of PSM, and provide a solution
2

to help the “poor” clients save power. Second, we propose a new authentication scheme, which is resistant to the shoulder surfing, smudge, and keylogger
attacks, to protect a user’s private information. Thirdly, we investigate location
access in background in app markets. We study the potential privacy breaches
caused by such an action, and propose a preliminary solution to address this
problem.

1.1

Arbitrating Traffic Contention for Power Saving with Multiple PSM Clients

As WiFi offers high bandwidth and free data transmission, it is a preferable choice
for most mobile users to access Internet services. However, the data transmission over WiFi quickly drains up the battery of a mobile device [98, 7, 4]. IEEE
802.11 standards provide PSM for mobile devices to conserve energy. PSM allows mobile devices to retain in sleep status by turning off network components
if there is no data to be transmitted, and mobile devices wake up periodically to
check whether there are packets buffered on AP.
In an ideal scenario that one AP serves one PSM client, the client can finish
receiving buffered packets as soon as possible. However, it is quite common that
there are multiple PSM clients associated to a single AP in real environments.
Each PSM client has to contend with the others for the data channel. Assisting
all PSM clients to save power is a hard work, since each of them hopes to save
as much power as possible. We create an energy conserving model to benefit
all PSM clients under fairness constrain. We prove that optimizing the energy
conserving under the fairness constrain is an NP-Complete problem. Then, we
focus on handling a specific PSM contention problem. When one client occupies
the channel, the others have to wait under high power mode. If some clients have
many data packets buffered at AP to be transmitted (e.g., users download large
files to the device), they will dominate the data transmission during the whole
beacon period, costing those clients that have only very few packets buffered at
3

AP (e.g., users check e-mail or send short messages on the device) a long period
of waiting time to win the contention for data transmission. Thus, the existing PSM
favors the clients that consume more link resource with higher energy efficiency,
but penalize the clients with less link resource consumption in power saving. This
leads to an unfairness problem, i.e., a rich in link resource consumption becomes
richer in energy efficiency, and a poor becomes poorer.
We propose a harmonious power saving mechanism (HPSM) to address the
unfairness problem in PSM. The key idea is to use the fundamental sociological
concept [31] to handle PSM traffic contention. We define the link resource as
public resource and mobile devices’ battery life as private resource. If a PSM
client consumes much public resource, it is rich; otherwise, it is poor. In real
society, poor people could not afford more expensive public services like higher
education, but they pay much lower tax rate. Similarly, in a system consisting of
one AP and multiple PSM clients, the clients consuming a large portion of link
resource should pay more for the service, but those consuming a small portion of
resource should get the service with less cost. HPSM intentionally prioritizes the
data transmission of poor clients over that of rich clients. The early completion of
data transmission allows the poor clients to switch back to sleep status for more
significant power saving. Meanwhile, as poor clients only occupy the data channel
for a very short period of time, the tax in terms of latency and energy paid by these
rich clients are minor.
We implement prototypes of HPSM based on Mad-wifi and NS-2. We first
conduct an experimental evaluation using a testbed with four smartphones, then
involve more clients in the simulation environments. Our evaluations show that
HPSM can help a poor PSM client save up to 25% energy comparing to existing
PSM solutions on the real device. We also evaluate the effectiveness of HPSM
with different ratios between the poor PSM clients over the rich, and how the
fairness constraint impacts the performance of the clients. As HPSM is an AP
side solution, it is easy to be incrementally deployed.

4

1.2

Exploiting Eye Tracking for Smartphone Authentication

Two authentication methods, passcode-based and finger movement pattern-based,
have been widely used by various smartphones for user authentication. However, previous research has revealed that both authentication methods are vulnerable to shoulder surfing attack [99], smudge attack [6], and keylogger attack
[14, 92, 66, 69]. For shoulder surfing attacks, an attacker could steal a password
just by peeking over a user’s shoulder when the user is entering its password. Recently, some researchers found that it is possible to steal a password even when
a user is behind some obstacles [91]. Smudge attacks exploit the oily residues
left on the screen for inferring a password. Keylogger attacks are launched from
the inside of device. The malicious program running on the smartphone utilizes
smartphone’s sensors to record the vibrations during the authentication. Then
attackers could figure out the password based on those information. All these
attacks exploit the information from user’s hand typing or finger moving activities.
The authentication methods leveraging eye tracking do not need hand input;
therefore, they are resistant to those attacks above. So far, there are already
some works applying eye tracking techniques in user authentication. These works
can be classified into biometric-based [9, 52, 47, 46] and pattern-based [54, 18,
20, 21]. The biometric-based methods authenticate a user based on the biometric
information extracted from the user’s eyes or eye movement characteristics. Differently, the pattern-based methods require a user to issue commands via their
eye movements. The pattern-based authentication can be further divided into two
types. The first type [54] tracks a user’s gaze point on the screen as the input. A
calibration process is required for predicting the gaze point accurately. And users
have to keep their heads fixed after the calibration. The other type [18, 20, 21]
recognizes a user’s eye movement trajectory that represents a specific command,
and does not need calibration process. Most of these eye tracking applications
are proposed for the devices with large screen. Many of them require special
hardware like high resolution eye trackers.
However, it is impractical for smartphone users to either carry a high resolution

5

eye tracker or conduct the calibration process. In this work, we propose a new
eye tracking authentication method for smartphone users. We leverage the eye
movement trajectories as the input, which reflect eye moving direction but not the
exact gaze point on the screen. Neither extra eye tracker nor calibration process
is needed.
In our proposed scheme, there are multiple moving objects on the screen, one
of which is the target. A user just tracks the moving target with her eyes. The authentication passes when the user’s eye movement trajectories match the target’s
movement trajectories. The routes of all moving objects are randomly generated
every time. Therefore, an attacker cannot infer the password by observing the
user’s eye movement during authentication. Each object should also move very
differently from the others, and thus the user’s eye tracking trajectory can easily
match the target’s trajectory. We develop a prototype based on Android 4.2.2 and
deploy it on Google Nexus 4 smartphone. Then we invite 21 volunteers to take the
user study. The evaluation results show that average authentication accuracy is
as high as 91.6%. The major research contributions of this work are summarized
as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first smartphone authentication
method applying the eye tracking technique that does not require extra eye
tracker and calibration process.
• We design a movement pattern for the authentication. The randomness
within the movement pattern reduces the risks of leaking a password. Besides, The movement pattern just requires four corresponding eye movement actions, which are basic and straightforward for users to perform, achieving high detection rate.
• We introduce and compare six metrics used for matching the eye movement
trajectory and target movement trajectory. We identify the most effective
metric based on our experiments. Four of them are not used in previous
works, and two newly introduced metrics lead to higher detection rate than
those used in the previous works.
6

• We implement a prototype on Android OS, and conduct a user study to evaluate the effectiveness of this proposed user authentication scheme.

1.3

Location Privacy Breach: Apps Are Watching You in Background

With the prosperity of smartphone market [71], Location Based Service (LBS) has
been widely applied to facilitate smartphone users. LBS fits the mobile platform
very well since real-time location data can be easily acquired via the GPS or networking components on a mobile device. Usually, the location of a smartphone
indicates the place where its owner stays. With the help of LBS, smartphone
users can benefit in many application scenarios, e.g., finding a restaurant or getting promotions of merchandises nearby. However, the location access also raise
concerns on privacy breach, which has been revealed in many previous studies
[35, 44, 45, 90, 94, 100].
On a mobile platform, the system resources including user location are managed and protected by OS. As one of the most popular mobile OSes, Android
protects user location via its permission mechanism, which requires apps to declare a permission before they are able to access the corresponding resource. For
example, an app can get precise location from GPS if the declaration for permission “ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION” is approved. Users can grant or revoke the
permission based on specific requirements. Although such a mechanism allows
users to make the decision on location access, it is quite difficult for users to determine whether a location access should be granted or not. Users rarely notice
the action of location access even though Android displays a notification on its
system bar [2]. There are some solutions, such as [28, 29], proposed to help a
user manage location access. However, these works focus on handling location
access in foreground. Apps collecting location in foreground get the data when
users interact with their UIs. These locations are usually discrete and may not
be the places that users are really interested in [28]. Differently, location access
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in background allows apps to continuously access locations. The location trace
can be used to infer the Points of Interest (PoIs) where users have stayed for
some time. The PoIs reveal more private personal information about users, and
the patterns of how users visit these places could further reflect the habituation of
users.
In this work, we study the privacy breach caused by location access in background in the popular app market. First, we examine the top 100 popular apps of
28 categories on the Google app market. Our measurements show that 1,140 out
of 2,800 apps declare the permission for location access. To our surprise, about
9% of the 1,140 apps access location in background. These apps demonstrate different characteristics in the access process, i.e., they request locations at different
granularities and frequencies, which could lead to the privacy leakage to different
extents. Then, we measure the potential privacy risks based on several widely
used privacy metrics. We leverage the Spatio-Temporal algorithm [8] to identify
PoIs from the location traces of users. We further extract the movement pattern
(P oIi → P oIj ) which implies the user’s habituation in daily activities, and use it to
measure the privacy risk incurred by location access. In comparison to the existing method of using the ⟨region, visited times⟩, using ⟨movement pattern, happen
times⟩ can bring earlier detection of privacy breach in many cases. Finally, we
propose a client side solution to help users manage location access based on the
privacy metrics. We utilize the adb technique to detect location access in background, without rooting the device or making any change at the system level. We
implement a prototype on Android 4.4 and validate its effectiveness.
The major contributions of this work are summarized as follows.
• We investigate location access in background and conduct the first measurement in the Google app market, and present the statistical analysis of their
characteristics.
• Based on the analysis, we identify the PoIs of a user in the location traces,
and further extract its movement patterns for privacy risk detection.
• We propose a light-weight client side solution to handle location access in
8

background. Our solution can strike a good balance between the user privacy and Quality of Service (QoS).

1.4

Overview

We organize this dissertation as follows. In Chapter 2, we present our observations on how the contention problem impacts the performance of PSM and our solution to this specific scenario. Chapter 3 presents the new authentication scheme
and the evaluation on its usability. The third work on privacy issues of location access in background of a smartphone is stated in Chapter 4. Finally, we conclude
this dissertation in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2

Arbitrating Traffic Contention for
Power Saving with Multiple PSM
Clients
The data transmission over WiFi can deplete the power resource of smartphone
quickly. IEEE 802.11 provides PSM to help mobile client save power; however,
it does not work well in many cases. In this chapter, we investigate the impact
of contention problem on the performance of PSM. A PSM client can switch back
to sleep mode to save power after it finishes data transmission in ideal case.
Unfortunately, when multiple PSM clients associate to a single AP, the contention
for channel could make all of them waste much power during the waiting period.
We construct a model to minimize power consumption for all PSM clients, and
prove it is an NP-Complete problem.
Through the real device experiment, we find that it is worthy to favor part of
PSM clients to save power. We classify these clients as “poor” clients and give
them higher priority over the other “rich” clients to receive packet. When serve
these clients, we will check whether the packet re-schedule impacts the “rich”
clients much. We prove this concept is effective via real device experiments and
evaluate how the parameter Θ affects the performance of the solution in extensive
simulation experiments. Overall, the results show that HPSM can help the poor
10

client save around 25% power in our experiment environment, and it put no significant impact on the “rich” clients. Θ can be set dynamically to satisfy different
requirements on the tradeoff.
We elaborate this work as follows. The background and related works are
introduced in Section 2.1. The PSM traffic contention problem and the energy
conserving model are described in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we analyze the
specific contention problem based on the experimental results. Section 2.4 details
the design of HPSM and describes its implementation. The evaluation is given in
Section 2.5. Finally, we discuss this work in Sections 2.6.

2.1

Background and Related Work

In this section, we start with a brief introduction of 802.11 power work modes and
Virtual AP technology. Then, we describe the related research works.

2.1.1 Background
IEEE 802.11 standards provide two basic work modes: Constantly Awake Mode
(CAM) and PSM. CAM clients stay at active status - high power mode all the
time. Once AP receives a packet to a CAM client, it forwards the packet to the
destination immediately. CAM clients still stay at active status even when there is
no packets to receive. CAM mode brings the best network performance. In real
environments, devices that have consistent power supply, for example AC power
connection, would prefer to work under CAM mode. However, CAM clients waste
a lot of energy during the idle period, and hence CAM mode is not an energyconserving strategy for portable devices.
There are two types of PSM: static PSM and adaptive PSM. A static PSM [1]
client stays at sleep status - low power mode, if it has no packet to send or receive.
AP broadcasts Traffic Identification Map (TIM) to PSM clients periodically. TIM
tells PSM clients whether AP buffers packets for them. The period between two
broadcast messages is called a beacon period. Usually, a beacon period is set
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to 100 ms. The PSM clients wake up at the beginning of each beacon period
to check the TIM message. If no packet is buffered for a client, it turns to sleep
status. Otherwise, the client sends a PS_Poll message to notify AP that it is
ready to receive a packet. AP sends a packet to the client after it receives the
PS_Poll message. If there are more packets for the client, AP sets the ‘more’ bit
in the packet header to notify the client. This process continues till all packets are
delivered to the client.
Adaptive PSM [53] can switch between CAM mode and static PSM mode.
Usually, adaptive PSM allows clients to work like static PSM. They switch to
CAM mode based on some heuristics, for example the buffered packets exceed
a threshold, and send NULL frame to notify the AP. CAM mode can speed up the
data transmission. Once the clients accomplish the data transmission, they stay
idle in CAM mode for a period, after which they switch back to static PSM mode
in sleep status.
Virtual AP technology [62, 74] allows a physical AP to publish multiple service
set identifiers (SSIDs). Taking the open source project Mad-wifi[62] as an example, one AP can publish at most four SSIDs as four virtual APs. Each virtual AP
broadcasts beacon messages at staggered time. If the beacon interval is 100ms
and the first virtual AP broadcasts a beacon message at t, the second virtual AP
broadcasts at t+25ms and so forth. Virtual AP technology alleviates the PSM
traffic contention, because PSM clients can associate to different virtual APs and
then wake up at staggered time.

2.1.2 Related Work
Although PSM is proposed to help mobile devices conserve energy, it cannot bring
all expected benefits in many cases. To date, a variety of schemes have been
developed to enhance PSM from different aspects. We divide these previous
efforts into three categories: extending sleep period, handling traffic contention,
and miscellaneous. Our work falls in the second category.
Extending Sleep Period: In [53] and [73], adaptive techniques for WiFi man12

agement are firstly proposed to minimize WiFi energy consumption as well as to
bound the network latency for a specific network activity. STPM [3] adapts PSM
behaviors by considering both the current traffic and the application intent. The
current traffic is monitored and the application intent is retrieved from available
API. An adaptive U-APSD approach is also proposed in [16] for web browsing
and file downloading. In [68], two power saving mechanisms are proposed. The
first mechanism Sleeping allows the network subcomponents to stay at sleep status, when these components are idle. The second one Rate-Adaption modifies
the network devices’ frequency based on network traffic rate. M. Khan et al. [51]
mainly addressed the rate adaption problem of 802.11 n. They proposed to adjust
the rate for striking a balance between throughput and energy conservation.
Some works save power through fine-grained adaption. Micro Power [60] allows the WiFi interface to stay at low power mode in short intervals (several microseconds), which provides considerable opportunities for clients to save power.
SAPSM [72] utilizes a classifier to identify delay-sensitive applications. A client
switches between CAM and PSM according to application’s network activities.
Also, an algorithm is proposed in [17] to dynamically enable and disable a WiFi
interface based on the instant multimedia buffer size.
Some other works save power by reshaping traffics. In [80], PSM-throttling reshapes the TCP packet chunks so that a client can receive packets continuously.
Catnap [24] allows AP to buffer packets for clients’ applications. The buffered
packets are sent in burst so that the clients can take advantage of long idle periods for power saving. These works enhance power saving mechanisms for individual clients or specific application scenarios. They do not address the power
saving issue under the contention from multiple PSM clients, which is the focus
of our work. Note that our work could work in complement with some of them in a
mixed application scenario. For example, HPSM may cooperate with Catnap to
improve a client’s performance by assigning higher priority to it when it faces the
contention from other clients.
Handling Traffic Contention: In centralized PSM [89], different parameters are
introduced, such as listen interval and beacon interval, to enable clients to wake up
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at different periods. LAWS [59] allows AP to reduce contention through scheduling polling requests from clients. In [55], the authors formulated the problem of
saving power over all PSM clients and presented heuristic power saving solutions for multiple PSM clients. These works can alleviate the contention problem,
but they do not consider the balance between power saving and network performance (latency) at a fine-granularity level. They need the modifications on both
AP and client sides, which impedes them from being deployed in large scales.
In [41, 40], the authors revealed that PSM background traffics could trigger PSM
clients to drain battery. They proposed Scheduled PSM [39] to handle the contention based on a TDMA scheme. However, this work requires AP to take over
the channel using RTS/CTS or Self-CTS at the beginning of each time slot. It
is complex and requires the modification on IEEE 802.11 standards. Differently,
HPSM is an AP side solution that strikes a balance between power saving and
network performance.
Napman [74] is proposed to isolate PSM packets from CAM packets. PSM
packets are sent through a high priority queue without impacting fairness. Napman leverages virtual AP technology to handle the PSM traffic contention. But the
virtual AP technology can only handle the contention from limited number (4 by
default) of PSM clients. In addition, it cannot handle the contention when clients
associate to the same SSID. J. Manweiler et al. [63] investigated the network contention from multiple APs. They proposed Sleepwell to help clients save power
by avoiding the rush hour of traffic. SOFA [95] aims to minimize the total energy
consumption of the system. It calculates the ‘quota’ for all clients, and schedules packets based on the ‘quota’. The authors did not consider the impacts on
system performance incurred by interaction among PSM clients and AP. X. Lei
et al. [56] proposed a solution to reduce the contention between PSM nodes in
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN). The PSM clients are divided into three groups
corresponding to three priorities, then wake up for data transmission based on
their priorities. Yet they did not consider the priority assignment.
As far as we know, our work is the first to classify the PSM clients into “rich”
or “poor” in terms of their link resource usage, and offer the poor with higher pri14

ority over the rich for receiving packets. Meanwhile, we consider the loss of link
resource caused by the channel reservation.
Miscellaneous: DozeAP [38] helps a smartphone save power when it enables
tethering over WiFi. It allows the hotspot to negotiate with clients so that the
packet loss rate during the hotspot’s sleep period is reduced. C. Zhang et al. [96]
proposed a set of optimization mechanisms to lower the power usage by reducing
the redundant codec operations, video tail traffics, and dynamically relocating the
channel to maximize the transmission efficiency. In [84], 3G is the primary channel
for data transmission and WiFi is utilized as the second radio for power saving. F.
Lu et al. [61] improved the power saving for WiFi devices from a different perspective. By leveraging the sparsity in Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum of 802.11 b,
a proposed transceiver can transmit and receive packets at low clock rate. Thus,
it helps a client save power. These works resolve the different problems from our
work. They improve a client’s power efficiency by utilizing the system’s resources.
HPSM may also work in complement with some of them, for example, HPSM can
be deployed with DozeAP so that the poor client’s performance will be improved
and the hotspot can still save energy.

2.2

802.11 PSM traffic contention problem

In this section, we first briefly describe the PSM traffic contention problem. Then,
we define a model to optimize energy conserving for multiple PSM clients. We
show that the optimization is an NP-Complete problem.

2.2.1 The Contention Problem
When there is only one PSM client associating to an AP, the communication process between them is simple and clear. PSM can assist the client to conserve
energy as expected. However, multiple PSM clients associate to an AP is quite
common in real environment. In such case, PSM could fail to bring expected energy conservation. When AP communicates with multiple PSM clients in a beacon
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period. At the beginning of a beacon period, the AP checks its buffer and identifies packets which need be forwarded to the PSM clients. It broadcasts TIM to
notify all PSM clients. After the clients receive the TIM message, all of them try
to send PS_Poll to AP. But only one of them can win the contention and receive
packets from AP each time. During this period, the other PSM clients have to wait
at active status. The contention increases the waiting time of data transmission
for all clients. Probably all PSM clients could stay actively in the whole beacon
period, and hence have no chance to save power.

2.2.2 Energy Conserving Model Definition
Under PSM, AP passively responds to the PS_Poll, and the packets are delivered in random sequence for the contention. In a long term, we assume that each
client can get the channel for receiving packet with equal probability. All clients
will receive packets in turn; therefore, they could stay actively in a whole beacon
period, which results in no energy conserving. If AP schedules the packets of
some clients with higher priority so that they can finish data transmission earlier in
a beacon period, these clients can switch to sleep status in the remainder of the
beacon period for power saving. However, the schedule will bring unfairness to
the other clients since it increases the delay of receiving packets to them. Hence,
the loss of fairness should be bounded so that the negative consequence is tolerable for those clients. We define an energy conserving model to proactively
schedule packets for achieving this objective. Given a sequence of packets, the
model will schedule the packets to maximize the power saving for all clients. In the
meantime, the unfairness incurred by the schedule is bounded. In the following,
we present the details of the energy conserving model.
Assume we have a sequence of packets Q = {p1 , p2 . . . pm } for n clients. For
each packet pi ∈ Q, pi is identified by a tuple (c, #), where c denotes the client
it belongs to, and the notation # denotes its position in Q. We introduce pi .c to
denote the client which pi belongs to and pi .# to denote pi ’s position in Q (pi .# =
i). After the packets are re-scheduled (switched) by the model, a new sequence
is generated as Q′ = {p′1 , p′2 . . . p′m′ | m′ ≤ m}, where Q′ ⊆ Q (p′ℓ ∈ Q). For a
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packet p′ℓ in Q′ , if (p′ℓ .# − ℓ) > 0, it means the packet has been moved forward and
the packet switch incurs unfair delay to those packets which are in front of this
packet before switch. We use p′ℓ [val] = p′ℓ .# − ℓ to denote the loss of fairness if a
packet has been moved forward; otherwise, p′ℓ [val] = 0. We add up the number of
positions being moved forward for each p′ℓ ∈ Q′ to denote the total loss of fairness.
∑|Q′ | ′
B is defined as the fairness bound. We have the constraint:
ℓ=1 pℓ [val] ≤ B.
Then we measure the energy conserving after packets switch. During packet
switching, we need to guarantee the packet sequence of a specific client should
not be changed. For all l ∈ [1, |Q′ |], where p′ℓ [c] = j, we use the notation TSj
to denote p′ℓ [val] where p′ℓ is the last packet of the client in sending queue. The
larger this value, the earlier the client can finish data transmission. Similarly, the
larger the sum of TSj , the more energy the clients can conserve. Note although
the last packet’s delivery time determines the energy conserving, we could still
move multiple packets forward to make a client finish packet receiving earlier.
For example, the positions of a client’s last two packets are 6 and 7. If we attempt
to move the last packet forward to position 5, both packets need to be moved.
So, TSj represents the energy conserving and the sum of p′ℓ [val] is for the loss
of fairness, where p′ℓ [c] = j. The formal definition of the model is described in
Figure 2.1.
INPUT: m, n ∈ Z+ , a fairness bound B and a
input sequence of Q = {p1 , p2 . . . pm }.
∑|Q′ |
CONSTRAINS: l=1 |p′ℓ [val]| ≤ B.
OUTPUT: Is there ∑
a new sequence Q′ , where
Q′ ⊆ Q, with Max( j∈[1,n] TSj ).
Notations: Let p′ℓ denote the ℓth element in
Q′ . Since Q′ ⊆ Q, p′ℓ ∈ Q. For all l ∈ [1, |Q′ |]
where p′ℓ .c = j, we use the notation TSj to
denote the last (p′ℓ [val]), where p′ℓ [c] = j.
Figure 2.1: The energy conserving model definition.
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2.2.3 NP-Complete Proof
In this section, we show that the energy conserving problem is NP-Complete.
∑
Seeking the optimal energy conserving for all clients ( j∈[1,n] TSj ), we introduce
a parameter k to represent the energy conserved under any schedule that is con∑
strained by the fairness bound, such that ( j∈[1,n] TSj ) ≥ k.
First, we show that this problem is in NP. The packets are chosen from Q and
∑
∑|Q′ |
put in Q′ , then the verification process calculates l=1 |p′ℓ [val]| and j∈[1,n] TSj for
comparison. The whole process takes polynomial time in the size of input.
Second, we demonstrate that a known NP-Complete problem, the Partition
problem, is reducible to our energy conserving model in polynomial time. The
definition of the Partition problem is:
Given a finite set A = {a1 , a2 , . . . , an }, where ai is a positive number, is there
∑
∑
A′ ⊂ A, such that a′ ∈A′ a′i = 1/2 ai ∈A ai ?
i

Our goal is to prove that there exists a reduction F (·) in polynomial time, which
can bring yes instance F (X) of the energy conserving problem iff X is yes instance of the Partition problem. Given the set A in the Partition problem, F (·) will
convert it to the energy conserving problem. For each element ai ∈ A, we create
∑
a packet pi , where pi .c = i and pi [val] = ai . We also set B = 1/2 i∈[1,n] ai and
∑
k = 1/2 i∈[1,n] ai . The conversion is completed in polynomial time. Then we
show that the energy conserving model returns yes with inputs Q, B and k iff A
has a partition.
If A has a partition, there exists a set A′ ⊂ A, where

∑

For each a′i ∈ A′ , we have a packet p′i corresponding

∑

′
a′i ∈A′ ai = 1/2
ai ∈A ai .
to a′i . Then we create

∑
a new queue in which we put these packets in Q′ such that p′ ∈Q′ p′i [val] =
i
∑
∑
∑
∑
′
[val]
=
1/2
a
1/2 ai ∈A aj = B and
T
=
p
ai ∈A i = k. On
j∈[1,n] sj
p′ ∈Q′ i
i

the contrary, if the energy conserving model returns yes when the inputs are Q,
B and k, there exists a new queue in which we have the packets moved for∑
∑
ward in Q′ , where p′ ∈Q′ p′i [val] ≤ B and j∈[1,n] Tsj ≥ k. Tsj = p′i [val], where
i

p′i .c

= j, since each client only has one packet based on our construction. We
∑
∑
∑
have p′ ∈Q′ p′i [val] = 1/2 ai ∈A ai , because B = k = 1/2 ai ∈A ai . For each
i

p′i ∈ Q’, where p′i [val] > 0, we have a corresponding a′i in A′ that is a partition of
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A.

2.2.4 Rich and Poor in the Contention Problem
Although saving power for all PSM clients under the constraint is an NP-Complete
problem, it is possible to help some PSM clients save power. We can consider a
WiFi system containing one AP and a group of PSM clients as a small society, in
which the PSM clients present as the residents. We define the link bandwidth as
public resource and the client’s battery as private resource. The clients consuming a large portion of public resource (i.e., link bandwidth) are classified as the
rich, and the clients consuming a small portion of link bandwidth are classified as
the poor. To be fair, the rich should pay more private resource (i.e., battery consumption) for using public resource while the poor should pay less of its private
resource. However, the contention problem causes unfair energy consumption to
the poor clients. For example, two PSM clients associate to AP. Client 1 has two
packets buffered on AP, and client 2 has 10 packets. If AP schedules all client 2’s
packets to deliver first, client 2 can finish receiving packets as early as possible.
However, client 1 has to wait for a long period at high power status, which is unfair for client 1. Alternatively, if AP delivers all packets to client 1 first, client 1 can
finish receiving packets and switch to sleep status soon. And client 2 just waits
for a short period at high power status, which could be tolerable for client 2. As
mentioned in the model definition, we should consider the impact of the induced
delay for re-scheduling the packets. In the following, we first show how the traffic
contention impacts the poor client’s performance unfairly through the experiment
with real devices in Section 2.3. Then, we present how we handle the problem in
Section 2.4.

2.3

Analyze the PSM Contention Problem

We demonstrate the negative impacts of PSM traffic contention upon a poor PSM
client in terms of power consumption and performance by conducting real exper19

iments.

2.3.1 Experimental Setup
Our testbed consists of one physical AP and four smart-phones working under
the PSM mode. We plug a D-Link DWA552 (AR5416 Chipset) in a Dell Precision
390 workstation, which works as the AP. The running OS is Opensuse with kernel
2.6.37.6. We choose the driver ath9k provided by the open source project Madwifi, as it provides stable performance and supports virtual AP technology. We
use four Sprint HTC Hero smartphones equipped with the WiFi chipset TI 1251
as the PSM clients. The OS is Android ROM of Cyanogenmod 7 with customized
kernel which supports standard PSM. We use Monsoon [70] to measure power
consumption on a smart phone. AP creates an object corresponding to a client
when the client associates to AP. We calculate the average latency and record
packet retransmission on AP for each object when the events (packet delivery
or retransmission) are detected. The WiFi system parameters are listed in Table
2.1. The beacon interval is set to 100ms. The bit rate is set to 1Mbps so that we
can easily observe the contention when the bandwidth is relatively small. One of
the smart phone is set as poor. We send one packet to the poor every beacon
period. The bit rate is about 44Kbps. We send about five packets to each rich
client during a beacon period under bit rate of 220Kbps. All packets carry the
payload in the same length. Each experiment is 180 seconds long and repeated
three times. During the measurement, we turn off the smart-phones’ screens and
no other applications are running in the background.
Table 2.1: System parameter setup
Parameters
802.11 mode
Beacon interval
Bit rate
P oor’s bit rate
Rich’s bit rate

Value
b
100ms
1 Mbps
1 pkt/beacon(44kbps)
5 pkts/beacon(220kbps)
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2.3.2 Impact of PSM Traffic Contention
Based on our testbed, we conduct a series of experiments to investigate the impact of PSM traffic contention upon PSM clients. There are one poor PSM client
and three rich PSM clients associating to a single AP. At the beginning, all of them
are in sleep status. Then we start to send packets to them. AP broadcasts TIM
information at the beginning of the beacon period. PSM clients wake up to check
TIM, and find that they have packets buffered on AP. Then they send PS_Poll to
AP for receiving packets. Each PSM client will contend for the channel with the
others so that AP can receive its PS_Poll. The packet request and delivery will
be in a random sequence, as shown in Figure 2.2.
Client 1
Client 2
Client 4
Client 3

<ps-poll> <packet>

Client 1
Client 2
Client 3
Client 4

Client 1
Client 3
Client 4
Client 2

Client 2
Client 3
Client 4
Client 1

<ps-poll> <packet> <ps-poll> <packet> <ps-poll> <packet>

AP
Time

Figure 2.2: Multiple PSM clients contend for data transmission.

2.3.2.1

Snapshot of A Beacon Period

The poor client switches to sleep status after data transmission. However, the rich
clients will keep in active status for data transmission. Each rich client could send
two continuous PS_Polls at the beginning of a beacon period: one is the reply to
the beacon broadcast message; and the other is the response to the more bit in
the last received packet. The consequence is that the poor spends a long period
of time, during which it stays at high power mode, to win the contention.
Figure 2.3 depicts the poor’s power measurement of a typical beacon period
when it faces the contention from three rich clients. The poor almost waits 40ms
for receiving a packet after it wakes up. On average, the poor client has to wait
33.76ms in a beacon period before it’s PS_Poll is handled and the related power
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Figure 2.3: Power measure- Figure 2.4: Power consumpment in a beacon period
tion of the poor client.

consumption is 44mJ. By contrast, in the scenario that only one client associate
to AP, the client only need to wait 13.13ms and the corresponding power consumption is merely 18.63mJ. Thus, the contention cause 136% increase in power
consumption for the poor client. The rich stays at active status during a whole
beacon period, which makes it look like a CAM client. This is because the rich
always has packets to receive in the beacon period and it has to wait while AP is
serving the other two.

2.3.2.2

Escalated Contention

To further demonstrate the PSM contention impact upon the poor’s power consumption and performance, we vary the number of rich clients from 0 to 3 in the
controlled experiments. We implement a high priority PSM scheduler on the AP,
which puts CAM packets into normal sending queue but puts PSM packets into
sending queue with high priority. In the escalated contention, we also compare
the scenarios between with and without virtual AP technology.
Contention’s impact on power consumption. Figure 2.4 shows that the
poor’s power consumption linearly increases with the rich’s number increasing
from 0 to 3. There are three schemes being measured. For virtual AP 1:1:1:1, we
divide a physic AP into four virtual APs (V AP1 , V AP2 , V AP3 , V AP4 ). The virtual
APs broadcast beacon messages at stagger times with the gap of 25ms. Each
PSM client associates to a different virtual AP. The virtual AP technology can
alleviate the contention to some extent. Every client wakes up at stagger time, so
22

120

Retries Per Packet

Average Latency(ms)

0.2

High Priority PSM
Virtual AP 1:1:1:1
Virtual AP 4:0:0:0

140

100
80

High Priority PSM
Virtual AP 1:1:1:1
Virtual AP 4:0:0:0

0.15
0.1
0.05

60
0
0

1

2

3

0

Rich PSM Client Number

1

2

3

Rich PSM Client Number

Figure 2.5: Average latency of Figure 2.6: Retries per packet
the poor client.
of the poor client.

the contention is not as serious as the basic high priority PSM scheme. When the
number of rich clients is less than 3, the poor client can complete data transmission
in a short period. Since no client associates to V AP4 , the poor client experiences
light contention. However, when there are three rich clients, the contention in
V AP1 ’s beacon period is exacerbated due to the involvement of data transmission
from V AP4 .
For virtual AP 4:0:0:0, we still divide a physic AP into 4 virtual APs as above.
But all PSM clients associate to the same virtual AP. The heavy contention causes
the poor client waste energy for receiving packets. As shown in Figure 2.4, under
virtual AP 4:0:0:0, the poor client’s energy consumption is quite similar to that
under high priority PSM. Thus, the virtual AP technology cannot handle the PSM
traffic contention well when all PSM clients associate to a single AP. Unfortunately,
it is quite common in real environments that multiple PSM clients associates to
either a physical AP or a virtual one.
Contention’s impact on latency. Besides power consumption, the contention
also affects the poor client’s network performance. Figure 2.5 shows that the average latency of packet delivery increases with more PSM clients involved. We
expect to see that the average latency of virtual AP 1:1:1:1 is much lower than
that of the high priority PSM. However, virtual AP technology’s improvement on
average latency is not as much as that of power consumption. The reason is that
packets are buffered for some time at AP, which forms the major part of average
latency.
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Contention’s impact on retransmission. Figure 2.6 shows average packet
retransmissions of the three schemes, from which we can see that the average
retransmission increases with the contention is intensified. Under the heavy contention, the link will get to be saturated and the probability of packet loss will increase. Both the clients and AP could suffer packet losses under the contention.
Consequently, they have to retransmit the dropped packets, which will impose
extra workload on the system and incur more packet losses later on.
In summary, a poor client suffers high energy consumption and performance
degradation under PSM traffic contention. Although PSM traffic contention is not
the only factor impacting the poor client’s performance, the degradation of performance is evident when traffic contention is intensified. So, we focus on handling
traffic contention to improve the poor client’s performance. As power is the client’s
private resource and link bandwidth is the public resource of the wireless system,
it is unfair that the poor spends plenty of private resource for using a small portion
of public resource. A client should pay proportional private resource for public
resource it consumes. In the next section, we present the design of HPSM and
explain how it addresses this unfairness problem under the PSM traffic contention.

2.4

Design and Implementation

We propose a new power save solution HPSM to help poor clients save power
when they face the contention from rich clients. HPSM’s basic idea is introduced
in this section. We also implement prototypes of HPSM based on a real system
and a simulation system.

2.4.1 HPSM Design
We schedule the downlink packets to favor the poor PSM clients. Although the
clients are identified as poor mainly based on the public resource they consume,
different strategies of scheduling packets will have different impacts on the system’s performance and energy consumption. In the following, we first assume
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all PSM clients are poor and explain the strategy chosen for scheduling packets. Then, we refine the classification of poor clients based on the claimed link
resource and the packet schedule strategy.
Serve the clients associating to the AP. In the preliminary experiments, we
observed that a PSM client contends with the others for taking over the channel.
Such a contention will make the clients wait at high power mode. If a client can
receive packets from AP without interruption, no energy will be wasted because of
the contention. So, uninterrupted delivery is the preferable choice. Furthermore,
the sum of all clients’ energy consumption is minimal when AP uninterruptedly
serves the clients that are sorted in ascending order of time for receiving their
buffered packets. For example, the service time needed by the four clients is
TC1 = 15ms, TC2 = 12ms, TC3 = 20ms and TC4 = 8ms, AP should serve the clients
in the order of C4 , C2 , C1 and C3 . However, if AP does not follow the shortest-jobfirst (SJF) order, e.g., the order is C4 , C1 , C2 and C3 , the awake time of C2 and C1
in this case is longer than that in SJF. In other words, the energy consumption of
the latter case is larger. It has been proved in [95].
The schedule also benefits adaptive PSM clients. When the buffered packets
of an adaptive PSM client does not exceed a threshold, the client will work under
the static PSM mode. In such a case, we consider PS_Poll packet in the transmission time. When the number of buffered packets exceeds the threshold, the
client will not send PS_Poll to AP for receiving the next packet. Instead, AP will
continuously send packets to the clients. Therefore, the transmission time is approximately the total length of buffered packets divided by the bitrate. We assume
that a static PSM client has x1 buffered packets with lengths L1 , L2 , . . . , Lx1 and
an adaptive PSM client has x2 packets with lengths L′1 , L′2 , . . . , L′x2 . The length
of PS_Poll is Lpoll and the data rate of link is B. AP sends the packet right
after it receives the PS_POLL message. For the static PSM client, it spends
Li +Lpoll
B

+ δ to receive one packet and request for the next one, where δ repre-

sents the interval between receiving packet Li and sending PS_POLL for the
next packet Li+1 . δ varies with the hardware and software of the client. The
approximate time which the static PSM client spend to receive all packets is
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T1 = (

L1 +Lpoll
B

L2 +Lpoll
+
B
L′1 +L′2 +···+L′x2
.
B

+ δ) + (

PSM client is T2 =

δ) + · · · +

LX1
B

and that spent by the adaptive

AP could serve two types of clients (the PSM clients and CAM clients) in a
beacon period. We divided all clients into two groups. The first group only consists
of poor PSM clients, and the second group contains rich PSM clients and CAM
clients. AP uninterruptedly serves the poor PSM clients in order at first. Since the
rich PSM clients in the second group will stay awake for the whole beacon period,
AP serves them and CAM clients with the same priority. It means that AP serves
the clients in the second group based on the packet’s time stamp. Because AP
can send packets to PSM clients via either high priority queue or normal queue,
scheduling packets based on their time stamp can well balance power saving and
fairness for PSM clients and CAM clients [74].
If AP first serves all the PSM clients in order and then the CAM clients (i.e.,
following the SJF order), the total energy consumption should be the minimal.
However, this SJF schedule strategy cannot be applied directly in a real system
because those clients, which need a long period for data transmission, could suffer
starvation under the schedule. In other words, these clients could have a little
chance to start packet receiving. The waiting time could be intolerable for some
applications, and make the PSM clients waste much energy without receiving any
packets. So, we introduce a delay constraint to mitigate the problem caused by
packet scheduling.
Refine the classification of poor clients. If a PSM client fulfills the following
two requirements, we classify it as poor. First, a poor PSM client should finish
receiving packets in a beacon period. The logic behind this requirement is intuitive. If a client cannot finish receiving packets in a beacon period, it implies that
the client has many packets to receive. Thus, the client will consume more link
bandwidth and stay awake in that period. Such a client should not be classified
as poor. Second, the delay incurred by the uninterrupted service should be tolerable for other clients. We explain this requirement by introducing the notation
of Θ, which is the factor constraining the delay. In our case, it is calculated by
Θ = Tbeacon − Twait , where Twait is the longest time a client can wait. Each client
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has a specific Twait . The minimal one works for all the clients in the system.

Figure 2.7: AP identifies the poor client based on the time stamp in a beacon period.

As shown in Figure 2.7, we assume that AP has served m poor PSM clients
in time Tp . The clients m + 1, m + 2, . . . , m + n have sent the requests and are
waiting for receiving packets. The time of serving client m + 1 is TCm+1 . The time
of sending one packet to the remainder clients is Tw = tcm+2 + tcm+3 + · · · + tcm+n ,
where tci represents the date transmission time during which client Ci receives the
next packet from AP. If Tp +TCm+1 +Tw < Tbeacon −Θ, client Cm+1 fulfills the second
requirement. Then it is identified as a poor PSM client and put in group one. Θ
represents the constraint on delay in the system. It is set conservatively so that
the clients can receive packets before the waiting time exceeds Twait . Overall, a
big number of Θ means that the system cannot tolerate long delay. When Θ = 0,
there is no constraint on delay in a beacon period and AP can identify the most
clients as poor. When Θ = Tbeacon , no client will be identified as poor. And AP
will serve all clients following the 802.11 standards. We have more analysis and
discussion of Θ in Section 2.5.2 based on the evaluation results.
We identify the poor PSM clients based on the buffered packets. In real cases,
there could be unpredictable uplink and downlink packets when AP is serving a
client. These packets will contend for the link resource. After AP serves the
current poor client, the time left could not be long enough to serve the other clients.
Therefore, AP needs to check whether the next poor PSM client in the group is
still qualified for the uninterrupted service. In our solution, AP dynamically checks
whether the poor client can still be classified as poor before AP starts to serve it.
Algorithm 1 shows how AP classifies the poor clients and serves them. Function sort puts the PSM clients in ascending order based on their service times.
Function getRemainderTime returns the time left in the beacon period. When AP
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Algorithm 1 AP identifies the poor PSM clients
1: Inputs: PSM clients (C1 , TC1 ), (C2 , TC2 ), . . . , (Cm , TCm )
CAM clients (Cm+1 , TCm+1 ), (Cm+2 , TCm+2 ), …, (Cm+n , TCm+n )
2:
3: #At the beginning of beacon period
4: sort(PSM clients);
5: for each i in {1 to m} do
6:
Tp + = TCi ;
Tw = tci+1 + tci+2 + · · · + tcm
+tcm+1 + tcm+2 + · · · + tcm+n ;
7:
if (Tp + Tw ≤ Tbeacon − Θ) then
8:
putInPoorGroup(client i);
9:
else
10:
break;
11:
end if
12: end for
13:
14: #AP serves a poor client
15: getPoorClient();
16: if PS_Poll is from the poor client then
17:
transmitPacket();
18: else
19:
enqueueJobInDelayQueue();
20: end if
21:
22: #AP completes to serve a poor client
23: Tr =getRemainderTime();
24: Tp = TCi ;
25: update(Tw );
26: if (Tp + Tw ≤ Tr − Θ) then
27:
serve(Ci );
28: else
29:
emptyPoorGroup();
30: end if
31:
32: #AP completes to serve all poor clients
33: processDelayJobs();

is going to serve a poor client, it holds the requests from the others. We create a
scheduler to handle these requests, which are buffered in a pending queue. After a poor client is served, AP will check whether the next poor client has sent a
request before. If the request is in the pending queue, AP starts to serve it immediately. Otherwise, AP will wait for the request of this client. During this period, the
link is reserved for the poor client. It can start to receive packets in a short time.
So, the reservation offers the largest benefit to the poor. AP should not handle
any other client’s request during this period. If AP tries to do so, the contention
problem arises immediately because of the continuous communication between
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AP and the poor client. The whole process can be summarized as follows:
1. AP calculates the service time for each PSM client.
2. The PSM clients are sorted in ascending order of service time.
3. AP browses and identifies the poor PSM clients.
4. AP serves the poor PSM clients following the sorted order.
5. AP dynamically updates the poor client group after the current poor client is
served.
6. The jobs in the delay queue are processed after all the poor clients are
served.
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Figure 2.8: Implementation in mac802.11.

2.4.2 Implementation
We implement the prototypes of HPSM based on Mad-wifi [62] in a real environment and NS-2 with power saving extension [88] in a simulation environment,
respectively. Mad-wifi provides stable performance and good hardware compatibility. The system parameters are described in Section 2.3, and newly introduced
parameters are described in Section 2.5. We install the latest driver ath9k on
openSUSE. Since it has multiple sending queues with different priorities, we can
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easily isolate PSM traffic from CAM traffic. Figure 4.8 shows the main architecture of Mad-wifi and our modifications to the components. The 802.11 in NS-2
has the similar architecture. We implement the prototype on NS-2 mainly for validating the efficacy of HPSM with more PSM clients. We made changes in the
drivers’ (mac80211 and ath9k) source code. As shown in Figure 4.8, we created
a scheduler inside mac802.11. At the beginning of a beacon period, we classify
the clients based on their buffered packets. When AP gets a request from a “sta”,
we will process the request if it is from a poor client under service. Otherwise, the
request will be put in a pending queue. After the poor client is served, AP checks
whether the next client is still waiting for the uninterrupted service. When all poor
clients are served, AP then processes the pending tasks. The functions are called
when the corresponding events are triggered in drivers. The major functions are
implemented in “sta” (station management), “rx” (receiving), and “tx” (sending) in
mac802.11, as well as “xmit” (transmit) and “beacon” in ath9k.

2.5

Evaluation

In this section, we first evaluate how HPSM impacts the power consumption and
network performance in a real testbed environment. In particular, we compare
HPSM to the existing standards: normal PSM and high priority PSM. The configuration of our testbed is already described in Section 2.3.1, and we have four HTC
smartphones running as PSM clients. Since HPSM aims to reduce the contention
problem among PSM clients, we mainly evaluate the performance of PSM clients
and no CAM traffic is introduced. Then, we conduct simulation experiments based
on NS-2 with more clients involved.

2.5.1 Controlled Experiments in Real Testbed
In the controlled experiments, we set one client as the poor and three other clients
as the rich. We send one packet every beacon period to the poor under bit rate
of 44 Kbps, and we send five packets to each rich client every beacon period
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under bit rate of 220 Kbps. The number of the rich PSM clients varies from 0 to
3, representing the different PSM traffic contention levels.
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sumption of the poor client. sumption of the poor client.

In Section 2.3.2, we can see that the poor has to wait for a long period of time
(33.76ms in a beacon) to get AP’s response under high priority PSM. However,
HPSM can hold the rich’s requests and reduce the contention. Thus, the poor
client is able to send out PS_Poll and receive AP’s response as early as possible.
After the data transmission completes, the poor client switches to sleep status.
Figure 2.9 shows the poor client’s power consumption measurement in a beacon
period under HPSM. Even when there are contentions from other three rich PSM
clients, the poor client just waits about 15ms for receiving packet in the beacon
period. Clearly HPSM brings two benefits. The first is that the poor can save more
power. The second is that traffic contention is reduced in the following beacon
periods, since each rich client just needs to face the contention from the other
rich clients.
With the number of rich PSM clients increases from 0 to 3, the poor client
will encounter heavier and heavier traffic contention. Figure 2.10 shows that the
power consumption of the poor client under HPSM is obviously smaller than that
under high priority PSM, and the difference between HPSM and high priority PSM
is enlarged with the intensifying contention. The experimental result shows that
HPSM assists the poor client to save up to 25% power when it faces the contention
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from three rich clients. In Figure 2.4, the virtual AP technology brings higher energy conserving in case “Virtual AP 1:1:1:1” when the number of clients is less
than the number of virtual APs. We want to stress that virtual AP cannot handle
traffic contention when multiple clients associate to the same virtual AP. However,
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HPSM is capable of helping the poor client conserve energy in such a case.
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We further investigate the power consumption from a more detailed perspective: the energy consumption for receiving a packet. Because there are packet
losses during data transmission, energy consumption per packet is an accurate
indicator of power efficiency of data transmission. For example, a client receives
x packets during a period of t ms. The average power consumption during this
period is p mW. Later on, it receives y(x > y) packets during the same period of t
ms. The average power consumption is still p mW. However, the client’s energy
p·t
p·t
consumption per packet of the former period ( 1000·x
) is smaller than that ( 1000·y
) of

latter period, which means that the client’s power efficiency in the former period
is higher. Figure 2.11 displays the poor client’s energy consumption of receiving
a packet. Similarly, compared with high priority PSM, HPSM is able to help the
poor client improve its energy consumption per packet by 25%.
Besides the power consumption of a poor client, we also study the energy
consumption of rich clients. Since there is only one power monitor, we do separate
experiments to measure the power consumption for each rich client. In Figure
2.12, the x-axis represents the number of rich clients in one set experiment; and
y-axis shows the sum of rich clients’ power consumption. The rich clients’ power
consumption under HPSM is quite similar to that under high priority PSM in the
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three cases. The reason is that all rich clients stay at active status in the whole
beacon period. Although their tasks are put into the pending queue by HPSM,
it brings negligible impacts on the power consumption of the rich clients. Figure
2.13 shows that the energy consumption per packet of rich clients under HPSM
increases up to 3% in comparison to that under high priority PSM. The reason is
that HPSM reserves the network resource for the poor client, which decreases
the number of packets received by the rich clients. We regard the increase of the
energy consumption per packet as the cost that the rich clients pay for the more
bandwidth they consumed.
In the following, we further investigate the scenario in which two poor clients
and one rich client associate to a single AP. Figure 2.14 shows the energy consumption per packet of one poor PSM, which is 23.95mJ under HPSM. It is larger
than the energy consumption of the poor client (20.58mJ) when it faces the contention from only one rich client under HPSM. In the former case, the two poor
clients need to share the benefits provided by the rich client; however in the latter
case, the poor client takes all the benefits from the rich client.
Given a certain number of rich clients, when the number of poor clients increases, the gain of a poor client decreases because it has to share benefits with
the other poor clients. On the other hand, although the increase of rich client population will intensify the contention problem, HPSM can effectively protect a poor
client’s performance from serious degradation by favoring the poor with higher
scheduling priority over the rich, under this intensified contention scenario.

2.5.1.2

Evaluation of Network Performances

The PSM traffic contention causes the poor client to spend extra time to win the
chance of receiving a packet under high priority PSM. Thus, the poor client’s average latency in packet delivery will increase with the contention getting more serious. However, HPSM allows a poor client’s packet to be sent ahead of the rich
clients’ packets, and hence the average latency of poor client under HPSM can
sustain at a low level. Figure 2.15 shows the average latency of the poor client:
under high priority PSM, it significantly increases when the traffic contention is in33
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packet of the poor client. put of the system.

tensified; but it does not change much under HPSM. Compared with high priority
PSM, HPSM shortens the latency by about 40% when there are three rich clients.
With more and more rich clients involved in the data transmission, the contention problem becomes intensified. In such a circumstance, the link will get
to be saturated, which increases the probability of packet loss. Both the clients
and AP will suffer packet loss under the contention. Consequently, they need to
retransmit the dropped packets. The unwanted retransmission will impose extra workload on the system and incur more packet losses later on. Figure 2.16
shows the poor client’s retries per packet increases with the traffic contention getting heavier under high priority PSM. HPSM reserves the channel to serve the
poor client, hence reduces the contention problem during its data transmission.
In comparison with the high priority PSM, HPSM can help the poor client reduce
retries per packet by up to 50% when there are three rich clients.
Although HPSM can assist the poor client to save more power and gain much
higher performance, it inevitably affects the performance of rich PSM clients. Besides the impact from HPSM, the contention also impacts the average latency
and retransmission of the rich clients. For a specific rich client, its network performance cannot be repeatedly determined given the same experimental setup,
because it will contend with the other rich clients. Therefore, we regard all rich
clients as a group and observe the HPSM’s impacts on their network performance.
As HPSM reserves network resource for the poor client, the consequence of reservation is that the rich’s packets cannot be sent out during the period of reservation.
So, the whole system’s throughput degrades while the poor’s performance is im34

proved. In Figure 2.17, the experimental results show that the system’s throughput decreases up to 9.4% comparing to high priority PSM when 4 clients associate
to the AP. However, in a long run, the reservation won’t happen in every beacon
period. The throughput degradation is much less than the worst case. When AP
sends one packet to the poor client every two beacon periods, HPSM helps the
poor client save up to 20% energy while the throughput only decreases by 3.6%.

2.5.2 Experiments in Simulation
We further evaluate HPSM with more clients by conducting two sets of simulation
experiments. In the first set, we mainly measure the Θ’s impact on the performance of clients under HPSM. In the second set, we evaluate HPSM by involving
the data flows of different packet sizes, real traffics, and the scenario in which only
poor clients exist.

2.5.2.1

Impacts of Θ

The experiments in our real testbed show that HPSM brings significant benefits
to the poor clients. We observe the similar results in our simulation experiments.
In the following, we mainly evaluate how the factor Θ impacts a poor client’s performance. Θ reflects the client’s requirement for timely data transmission in a
beacon period. The maximal constraint can fulfill all clients’ requirement for receiving packets in a timely manner. However, in some cases users may prefer
power saving to network performance, while network performance could be more
important in some other cases. We vary Θ to observe its impacts upon the system’s performance. When Θ = 0, the system has no constraint on scheduling
packets. In such a case, a client consuming few bandwidth has the highest probability to be classified as poor. On the other hand, Θ = 100 means that any packet
switch will violate the constraint and all packets are transmitted following the normal standards.
We set up the simulation environment with 10 nodes, one of which is the AP.
Two CAM clients (C1 , C2 ) and seven PSM clients (C3 , C4 , . . ., C9 ) associate to the
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AP. We establish CBR UDP flows from C1 to the other eight clients. The link rate
is set to 2Mbps. The default packet size is 512 Bytes and the traffic information
of the nine clients is listed in Table 2.2. According to our measurement in Section
2.3, we set the power of idle status and the power of receiving packet to 653.5
mW and 1039.5 mW, respectively. We run the experiments for about 90 beacon
periods.
Table 2.2: System parameter setup
Client

C1

C2

Flow rate (Kbps)
Flow direction

1344
outgoing

128
incoming

C3 , C4
C5 , C6
256
incoming

C7 , C8
C9
64
incoming

In this experiment, C3 , C4 , C5 , and C6 could be classified as poor, which happens at the beginning of data transmission. This is because, during that period,
the link is not saturated and there are just few packets of these clients buffered
at AP. However, C7 , C8 , and C9 consume the fewest bandwidth among the eight
clients that have downlink traffic. They are the potential candidates that HPSM
should help. Thus, we measure how Θ impacts the performance of these three
clients.
The y-axis in Figure 2.18 shows how many times a client is classified as poor.
For all the three clients, the number of times being classified as poor decreases
while Θ increases from 0 to 100. The high constraint causes the clients to be
classified as poor with low chance. When some clients cannot wait for a long time
to receive packets, they will request high constraint. Consequently, AP has little
time to serve the poor clients, and thus for a client, the chance of being classified
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as poor is low.
When a client is classified as poor, it can finish packet receiving in a beacon
period with high priority. In other words, a poor client can save power in the
beacon period. Figure 2.19 shows the average energy consumption per packet
of the three clients. When the constraint is low, the clients have high chance to be
classified as poor. Thus, they can save more power and the energy consumption
per packet is low. The energy consumption increases with the increase of the
constraint.
When Θ decreases from 100 to 0, for clients C7 , C8 and C9 , the counts of being
identified as poor increase from 0 to 105 (270 is the maximal number), which
means that the three clients are classified as poor for 105 times in total. Their
energy consumption per packet decreases from 1.51 to 0.64. For clients C3 , C4 ,
C5 , and C6 , the counts of being identified as poor increase from 0 to 19, but their
energy consumption per packet increases from 0.53 to 0.57. Although C3 , C4 , C5 ,
and C6 are classified as poor for a few times, they are identified as rich in most
times, during which AP serves C7 , C8 and C9 with high priority. Therefore, their
energy consumption per packet increases slightly with that of the poor decreases
significantly. Overall, the clients can save power in the beacon periods if they
are classified as the poor. In a long term, those clients that are identified as
poor for more times than the others will save power. Meanwhile, the delay of
the other clients is bounded by Θ. We regard the degradation of the rich clients’
performance as the tax paid for using more link resources.
The schedule strategy not only helps the poor clients save power but also
improves their data rates of receiving packets. According to Table 2.2, the overall
data rate (incoming + outgoing) excesses the link’s data rate. In such a case,
AP cannot transmit all the packets sent from C1 in a beacon period. The packets
will be buffered in the queue before they are scheduled for transmission. When
AP applies the standard schedule strategy, the poor clients have to spend a long
time to receive all packets. Differently, HPSM allows the poor clients to receive
packets with high priority. They can finish receiving packets in a shorter period.
Thus, HPSM improves the downlink data rate for the poor clients. The more times
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a client is classified as poor, the higher data rate it can achieve. In Figure 2.20,
the downlink data rates of the three clients are high when they can be classified
as poor for many times. Their data rates decrease while Θ increases.
When Θ increases, the clients have little chance of being identified as the poor.
The direct consequence is that the clients’ energy efficiency will decrease. Their
data rates will also be affected, because they will face the intensified contention
from other clients. However, the count of being identified as the poor is not the only
factor that can impact the data rate. The other factors like channel condition can
also impact the data rate. So, the data rate in Figure 2.20 may not strictly follow the
curve in Figure 2.18. Besides, in Figure 2.18, the individual performance varies
because each of them encounters contention to different extents. Overall, we can
observe that the total counts and data rate decrease as Θ increases in Figures
2.18 and 2.20.
We also observe that all the three clients are classified as poor in some beacon
periods, but as rich in some other beacon periods. At the beginning of the experiments, the link is not saturated, and AP can transmit packets before the buffer
queue is fully filled. The clients C3 , C4 , C5 , and C6 could be classified as poor at
this period. As the experiment goes on, the link gets to be saturated, which impacts both the uplink and downlink traffics. The interference and contention make
AP spend longer time to serve a poor client. Then, the rest of poor clients could be
re-classified as rich if the time is not long enough for serving them uninterruptedly.
In an ideal case, Θ should well balance the power saving of the poor and the
network performance of the rich when it equals the maximal constraint required
by all the clients. However, Θ can be set to a smaller value to satisfy the poor
clients, or set to a larger value to guarantee the rich’s performance. Note that in
any case, it should not be too large, say 50 (half of the beacon period based on
our experiments); otherwise, HPSM would bring negligible benefits to the poor.

2.5.2.2

Extended Experiments

With the fixed packet size, it is easy to demonstrate how much benefit or negative
impact brought by HPSM in the experiments above. But scheduling packets with
38

different sizes could result in a different impact to some extent. For example, when
the other parameters remain unchanged, transmitting a large packet will incur
more fairness loss comparing to that of transmitting a small packet. In either case,
scheduling a client’s packets with higher priority will benefit its performance and
negatively impact the performance of the other clients. Our algorithm classifies a
client by the data transmission time, which depends on both the number and size
of its packets. Thus, it can work for packets with different lengths. In the following,
we extend our evaluation for more application scenarios, which include the data
flows of different packet sizes, real traffics, and the case where only poor clients
exist.
First, we use the same experimental setup of Section 2.5.2.1 except varying
the packet size from 256 Bytes to 1024 Bytes for all clients. Based on our discussion in Section 2.5.2.1, HPSM is able to bring considerable benefits to the poor by
setting Θ ≤ 50. We measure how HPSM impacts the performance of clients C7 ,
C8 and C9 by setting Θ = 30. Figure 2.21 shows how many times the three clients
are classified as the poor. The results show that HPSM can identify the poor
clients when they receive packets in different sizes. When packet size increases,
the number of packets will decrease because the bitrate remains the same. In
the CBR flow, fewer large packets will be sent under light traffic at the beginning
period of the experiment. Therefore, for the packet sizes of 512, 768 and 1024,
the counts of being identified as poor are smaller than the counts of the other two
packet sizes. We also measure the energy efficiency of the three clients under
PSM and HPSM. Figure 2.22 shows how much energy is consumed for receiving
one byte data. We can see that HPSM improves the energy efficiency of the poor
clients comparing to PSM, no matter what size a packet has.
Second, to evaluate the HPSM’s performance based on the data flows in which
packets have different sizes, we generate traffic traces and conduct the trace
driven experiments. We introduce one CAM client, four PSM clients, and the
target client that receives the trace data, and set Θ = 50. The CAM client, the first
three PSM clients, and the fourth PSM client receive CBR flows at the bitrates of
128 Kbps, 256 Kbps, and 64 Kbps, respectively. We generate four types of traces:
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sumption per Byte.
sumption caused by trace.

the first date trace “Random” contains the data flows under the bitrate of 64 Kbps
in which the packets sizes are set randomly. Then, in a WiFi system under 2 Mbps
bandwidth, we use tcpdump [82] to capture the other three traces generated by
browsing web pages, using Facebook and Gmail apps on a smartphone. The
details of the four traces are listed in Table 2.3. The items in the row of “Packet size
(Bytes)” represent the minimum and maximum packet sizes in the data flows. For
real traffics, packets are not generated constantly because of the user interaction
with the apps. Consequently, the average flow rate of the real traces is not as
high as that of the CBR data flow. Figure 2.23 shows the energy consumption
under PSM and HPSM when we replay these traces. The target client consumes
the lowest bandwidth comparing to the others, therefore, HPSM will serve it as
the poor and improve its energy efficiency. For the trace “Random”, the energy
consumption per byte of the client is 2.45 mJ under HPSM, which is slightly smaller
than that (2.53 mJ) under PSM. We note that the energy consumptions per byte
of the other three traces are higher than that of “Random”. This is because the
lengths of the three traces are much longer than that of “Random”, and a longer
trace has more idle periods in which energy is wasted. Overall, we see that HPSM
improves the energy efficiency of a client in comparison to PSM.
Table 2.3: Trace details
Trace Name
Flow rate (Kbps)
Packets size (Bytes)
Trace length (beacons)

Random PktLen
64
[1:999]
90

Browse
17.73
[54:1514]
600

Facebook
7.24
[66:1464]
800

Gmail
3.15
[66:1484]
500

At last, we consider the scenario in which only poor clients exist. When the link
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is not saturated, it is possible that all clients are classified as the poor. A client can
be classified as the poor if it satisfies the two requirements mentioned before. In
this case, the clients are classified as the poor once they satisfy the requirement
of Θ. As we have discussed in Section V, when all clients are classified as the
poor, AP will serve them in sequence and the overall energy consumption should
be smaller than that under the original schedule. We introduce three poor clients,
which have the downlink CBR under the bitrate of 64 Kbps, in the experiments. As
expected, the overall energy consumption under PSM is 63.66 J and that under
HPSM is 60.01 J. Since the link is not saturated, the contention is not as serious
as that under a saturated link. Therefore, the benefit brought by HPSM cannot be
as high as that under the contention from the rich.

2.6

Discussion

To provide a comprehensive view of this work, we discuss HPSM’s limitations and
potential improvements in this section.
When AP is serving a client, there could be unpredictable uplink and downlink
traffics. We dynamically check whether the remaining time is long enough for
serving the next poor client. If the downlink traffic goes to the client that AP is
serving, AP will serve the client till all packets are transmitted uninterruptedly.
Then, other clients have to wait for a longer period. There is a potential solution
which could mitigate the problem caused by the unpredictable traffic. We limit the
time period, in which AP serves a poor client, to be the sum of service time of the
current poor client and the next one in the queue. For example, assume AP is
going to serve the poor client Ci , and AP should spend TCi + TCi+1 to serve Ci and
Ci+1 ; but when there is burst traffic going to Ci , AP can spend at most TCi + TCi+1
to serve Ci . Once the client runs out of the service time, AP stops to serve the
client and switches to serve the next one.
HPSM handles the general unfair energy consumption under the contention.
In HPSM, the clients consuming a small proportion of link resources have higher
priority for receiving packets than those clients that consume a large proportion
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of link resources. In real environments, there could be different definitions and
requirements on the priority. In fact, HPSM can work with other solutions in wireless networks for mixed applications. For example, if a session of a rich client has
higher priority for receiving packets, AP can deliver packets to it first, and then
continue to serve the poor clients.
Although we set Θ manually to observe its impacts upon the performance of
the system in this work, it is possible to adjust the value of Θ automatically. One
approach is to check the data flows’ protocols, since different protocols have different requirements on the delay constraint. For example, we can identify a flow
by observing the packet’s port, and then calculate the constraint (the longest time
it can wait). After all flows are handled, we will choose the biggest one as Θ.
In a system containing few poor clients but many rich clients, HPSM can help
the poor gain significant benefits. With the number of the poor clients increases,
the benefits decreases unavoidably because the poor clients have to share the
benefits. In our solution, we sort the poor PSM clients based on the service time
they need. Therefore, the poor clients share the benefits by following the rule that
a client pays more if it consumes more public resource. In addition, a client could
be classified as the rich in some beacon periods, but as the poor in some other
beacon periods. In a long run, any PSM client could benefit from HPSM.
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Chapter 3

Exploiting Eye Tracking for
Smartphone Authentication
The traditional authentication methods for smartphone users are facing the challenges from emerging attack vectors [91, 6, 12, 103]. Eye tracking as the input
of authentication system can be resistant to these attack vectors naturally. In this
chapter, by leveraging the high resolution camera equipped on smartphone, we
propose a new authentication scheme based on eye tracking. Specifically, we
design an eye tracking pattern with two advantages: 1. It is easy for the user
to perform because they only need to passively eye track the moving target on
screen. 2. The accuracy of detection is high because the distraction problem is
reduced as much as possible. We introduce and compare 6 metrics of detecting
whether user eye tracks the target. Our evaluation results show that the accuracy
of detection is as high as 91.6% which is contributed by a new introduced metric.
We organize and present this chapter as follows. We survey related work in
Section 3.1. In Section 3.2, we introduce threat models to the popular user authentication methods on smartphone. We present the new authentication method
in Section 3.3. Then we evaluate its effectiveness in Section 3.4. The limitations
of our work are discussed in Section 3.5.

43

3.1

Related work

Biometric information, such as fingerprint, has been used in authentication. However, researchers have shown that a fingerprint-based authentication system could
be defeated [64]. Moreover, an attacker may bypass the fingerprint-based authentication system using a carefully printed fingerprint image. Human behavioral biometrics have also been used for user authentication. Keystroke dynamics have
been studied as a second-factor for user identification. Each individual shows
unique rhythm during keypad tapping. Zahid et al. [93] extracted six features
from a user’s keystrokes for individual identification. In [15], neural network classifier is utilized to distinguish impostors from legitimate users when someone dials
a phone number or types text.
An abundance of sensors equipped on a smartphone can provide much valuable information on a user’s tapping behaviors. The sense data from multi-touch
screen, accelerometer, orientation and compass is translated to a user’s gesture
in work [57]. The data is used to train a classifier which can decide whether a user
is legitimate. Another work [19] collects touch pressure, size, X and Y coordinates,
and time as the raw data, then uses Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) algorithm to
decide whether the input data matches the legitimate user’s pattern. GEAT [76]
authenticates a user based on behavioral features, including finger velocity, device acceleration, and stroke time extracted from users’ hand input. Zheng et al.
[99] proposed an authentication method based on a four-feature combination (acceleration, pressure, size, and time). Their study indicates that the four-feature
combination can effectively distinguish impostors from legitimate users. Different
from other works, they used one-class classifier for user verification, which only
needs the legitimate user’s data in training. However, the work [75] reveals that
it is feasible to highly increase the equal error rate of the classifiers, which could
penetrate the second level authentication methods by utilizing the data from a
general population of operation statistics.
Authentication based on eye tracking can be classified into two categories. The
first authenticates a user using the biometric features of the user’s eyes or eye
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movements. The second authenticates a user based on eye movement patterns.
The biometric authentication methods in the first category extract biometric
features, e.g., the distance between two eyes, light reflection, and so on, to identify a user. These features belong to physical biometrics like fingerprint. Special
hardware such as the eye tracker is needed for catching a user’s biometric features. Usually, a calibration process will be launched before authentication, during
which the user keeps head fixed in the front of the eye tracker and stays a certain
distance from the device. Bednarik et al. [9] made the first step towards using
eye movements as biometric identification. They found that the distance between
eyes turns out to be the most discriminative and stable indicator. However, this
feature does not truly reflect the behavioral properties of eyes. The best dynamic
feature is the delta pupil size, which brings 60% identification rate in this work.
CUE [52] incorporates the individual and aggregated characteristics belonging to
a scanpath. Using the combination of Oculomotor Plant Characteristics (OPC)
and Complex Eye Movement (CEM) patterns, it can reduce the authentication error by 30% comparing to using one of them. It can also achieve the highest False
Rejection Rate (FRR) 18% and False Acceptance Rate (FAR) 20% at the same
time. Holland et al. [47] evaluated the effects of stimulus types and eye tracking
specifications on the accuracy of biometric verification based on CEM. The work
[46] presents an objective evaluation of utilizing patterns identifiable in human eye
movement to distinguish individuals. The authors hypothesized that the distribution of primitive features inherent in basic eye movements could be exploited to
uniquely identify a given individual. However, these works are not applicable for
portable devices because it is infeasible for a user to carry an eye tracker and
conduct calibration in public places.
The methods in the second category leverages gaze points as the input. To
use the authentication system proposed in [54], users input password by staring
at corresponding buttons on the display. Researchers also proposed to use the
trajectory of eye movement as password. Since recognizing a trajectory is much
easier than identifying the gaze points, these methods do not need calibration process and high resolution eye tracker. De Luca et al. [20] evaluated three different
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eye gaze interaction methods. They also investigated an approach on gaze gestures and compared it to the well known gaze-interaction methods. The authors
of work [21] introduced three types of password patterns-ShapePass, Eye Gesture and EyePass. ShapePass allows users to easily remember complex shapes,
which consist of arbitrary combinations of eight basic strokes (eight directions).
Eye gesture is constructed by different gaze tracks that represent different digits. EyePass is a combination of ShapePass and EyeGesture. They mentioned
that the stroke perfectly fits human eye’s biometric constraint because eyes move
in fast and straight saccade, and thus cannot perform any curves or other nonlinear shapes. EyePassShape [18] combines EyePin and PassShape. It requires
a user to remember some shape and draw the shape via eye movement actively.
Unfortunately, none of these works is applicable for smartphone users.
Some recent works reveal the feasibility of exploiting the eye tracking techniques for smartphone authentication. Drewes et al. [25] evaluated eye gaze
interaction as a new input method on mobile phones with the assistance of eye
tracker. They compared a dwell time based gaze interaction to the gaze gesture, and found that both methods are feasible on mobile phones. The work [83]
presents the first prototype of eye gesture recognition system for portable devices.
The system does not need any additional hardware. It incorporates techniques of
image processing, computer vision, and pattern recognition to detect eye gestures
in a video recorded by the device’s front camera. Normalized correlation coefficient is used as the metric which brings about 60% accuracy. Although eye gesture
makes authentication robust, users cannot easily remember the complex eye gestures in practice. The work [85] introduces a novel set of shape features, which
capture the characteristic shape of smooth pursuit movement over time. Each
feature individually represents incomplete information about the smooth pursuit,
but they can reflect the pursuit once combined. Pursuit [86] is proposed to recognize a user’s eye movement when the user tracks a moving target on a big screen
through eyes. It provides a general design guidance for pursuit applications.
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3.2

Threat Models

In this section we present the threat models in the existing authentication methods
on smartphone. Two kinds of authentication methods are popular among most
smartphone users. One is the passcode-based and the other is pattern-based. As
a classic authentication method, the passcode-based methods need a user to type
its passcode. Pattern-based methods require a user to move fingers following
some pre-set patterns. Both authentication methods are vulnerable to shoulder
surfing attack, smudge attack, and keylogger attack.
To launch a shoulder surfing attack, an attacker just peeks from a user’s shoulder when the user is entering the password. Then the attacker can infer the password based on the keyboard layout and the user’s typing actions. A recent research work [91] reveals that attackers could steal a password even if the user
is behind some obstacles. A smudge attack [6] exploits the oily residues, called
smudge, left on the touch screen to infer a user’s password. Attackers just hold
camera at special angle to the orientation of the touch screen, and put the device
under special lighting source and lighting angle. Under the certain conditions, the
password pattern could be exposed. Some other attacks utilizing the acoustic of
the tapping are introduced in [12, 103].
Keylogger attacks compromise a user’s password from the inside of device.
They leverage various sensors like the accelerometer and the gyroscope equipped
on a smartphone to extract the behavior features of each individual. These information could result in the leakage of a password. In [14], it is observed that
tappings on the different position of a screen cause different vibrations. Attackers can infer a password based on the vibration features. Xu et al.[92] proposed
to collect the information from more sensors like the accelerometer, gyroscope,
and orientation sensors. Using the collected information, they constructed the
user pattern to calculate the user’s action and input. TapPrints [66] estimates the
tapping location by using machine learning to analyze the motion data. In [69],
the authors can conjecture the input sequences using the data extracted from the
accelerometer sensor.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 3.1: (a) The layout of objects before they start to move (b) The four objects are
moving in four different directions (up, down, left and right) in a round.

3.3

A New Authentication Approach

Applying eye tracking techniques in user authentication can significantly reduce
the risks of suffering those attacks mentioned above. We design a new authentication approach based on eye movement pattern so that a smartphone user can
just use the device’s front camera and skip the calibration before each authentication. Compared to the user patterns like EyePassShape and Eye gesture [18]
which require a user to draw some shape using eyes actively, tracking the moving
object with eyes in a passive manner is much easier. Besides, users do not need
to remember the complex shapes but just the target object as a password. Considering that humans’ eyes move in fast and straight saccades and thus cannot
perform any curves or other non-linear shapes [21], we make the objects move
in straight lines for eye tracking. In the following, we first introduce the basic authentication process and the architecture of our eye tracking authentication system. Then we present how to measure the similarity between the eye movement
trajectory and the target movement trajectory.
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3.3.1 Authentication Process
The basic authentication process is described as follows. There are four objects
in the center of the screen at the beginning. The layout is shown in Figure 3.1a.
Each object is labeled with a number in the range of 1 to 4, and moves in a straight
line smoothly for five rounds. In each round, the four objects move to different
directions simultaneously. When the objects are moving, the user tracks the target
object using eyes. Figure 3.1b shows a snapshot when the objects are moving.
The target object represents the password in that round. When the objects start to
move, the user eye-tracks the target and could extend the vision in that direction
beyond the screen for providing a more clear eye movement trajectory. Once
the movements stop at the end of each round, all objects return to the original
positions. Meanwhile, there is a beep sound to notify the user to move eyes back
to the center. Furthermore, before the next round starts, all the objects pause for
one second to guarantee that the user moves eyes back to the center. The front
camera of the smartphone captures the eye movements and delivers the frames to
the analysis component, which extracts the eye points from each frames. Then a
set of metrics will be calculated based on the eye points. These computed metrics
are compared to those of the target’s movement trajectory. If the metrics match,
the authentication passes. Here is an example showing how our authentication
scheme works.
• The user sets the password like 1-2-3-1-4. Each digit represents the target
object in the corresponding movement round.
• When the user is ready, she just clicks the ”start” button to initiate the authentication.
• All the objects are moving at the same time, the user uses her eyes to track
the target object in that round.
• After the five rounds movement, the system outputs the match result.
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3.3.2 System Architecture
The authentication system’s architecture consists of two parts: the front-end and
the back-end. The front-end includes pattern design, route generation, and moving control. The back-end mainly captures eye movement trajectory and matches
it to the target movement trajectory. The architecture is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
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Recorder

Pre-Processor

Line
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Record Frames
and Moving
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points

Fit lines to
eye points

Decision
maker
Compare the
line to
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Figure 3.2: Architecture of the system

3.3.2.1

Front-end

We propose to secure the authentication by moving all the objects randomly each
time. Since the authentication process does not need hand input, the smudge
attack and keylogger attack cannot steal any information from the authentication
process. For the shoulder surfing attack, even if attackers record the eye movement and figure out the eye movement trajectories, they cannot pass the authentication by replaying the same set of trajectories. This is because the target’s
routes for moving are random in each time. Moreover, attackers have to deploy a
camera close enough to the user’s eyes to capture the eye movement trajectories,
which makes it a challenging task without alerting the user.
With respect to the layout, all the objects are in the center of the screen at
the beginning of each round. To make the user locate the target easily, the start
positions of all objects should not be changed in each round. Pursuits [86] shows
that the detection rate decreases when there are many objects on the screen.
We also find that users may look towards some other moving objects when they
are tracking the target. We call it distraction problem. It becomes serious when
two moving objects are close to each other. If we leave the objects at one side
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of the screen or the corners of the screen at the beginning, the objects could
move across one another. In addition, setting the start positions of the objects at
different corners may exposure the password. In such a scenario, the user will
look to a corner at the beginning of each round. Then, the attacker could figure
out the start position of the target by only observing the gaze direction of the user.
Thus, in our design, the objects move far away from each other while they are
clustered together in the center of the screen at the beginning of a round.

(a)

(b)

Figure 3.3: (a) The trajectories of four objects in a round (b) It is hard to tell which object
the user tracks with eyes when the trajectories of two objects are close to each other.

The four objects move to four different directions: up, down, left, and right,
which is shown in Figure 3.3a. There are four reasons for such a design. (1)
Since the screen of a smartphone is much smaller than a regular screen device,
the number of the moving objects on the screen should be small to avoid the distraction problem. (2) For the purpose of not exposing the target, all the objects’
movement directions are evenly distributed on the screen. Furthermore, the fewer
objects, the larger the angle between two objects’ movement directions. Consequently, it is easier to match the eye movement trajectory to the target movement
trajectory. In other words, it is easier to distinguish the eye movement trajectory
from the other objects’ movement trajectories. (3) Although users can look at any
direction theoretically, it is difficult for them to control eyes to move in an exact
angle. Looking up, down, left, and right are the four most basic and simplest eye
movement actions for users. (4) Since the eye movement just roughly follows
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the target movement, the problem appears when the eye movement trajectory is
close to two different objects’ movement trajectories. In such a case, it is hard
to tell which object the user eye-tracked. As shown in Figure 3.3b, it is unclear
which object the user is eye-tracking. In our design, the four directions are distinguishable from each other and help alleviate such problems.
Another disadvantage of a small screen is that the user’s eye movement could
be negligible if the user only looks inside of the screen boundary. Some users
could be able to look any positions on the screen without obvious eye movements.
In such a case, it is hard to tell the user’s eye movement trajectory. To make the
eye movement more clear to be detected, we allow the user to look beyond the
screen area following the target’s movement direction, and provide a beep sound
to remind the user look back when the movement ends.
In our current design, we just set five movement rounds in the prototype and the
corresponding key space is 45 = 1024. The key space can be enlarged simply by
allowing a user to choose different number of movement rounds for authentication.
Specifically, a password could consist of arbitrary number of digits. The system
first asks the user to input the number of movement rounds, then it provides corresponding object movements for authentication. More movement rounds make
the authentication safer. Note that the authentication method can be applied in
different scenarios, such as unlocking a phone and accessing an important file.

3.3.2.2

Back-end

We leverage the front camera to capture the eye movements. The record starts
when the target begins to move. It ends when the target finishes its movement
within one round. The eye tracking component will extract eye points from these
continuous frames. Like shown in Figure 3.4, it first detects the face position
using Six Segmented Rectangular (SSR) filter [50]. Then, the eye location will be
extracted by shaped-based approach based on the eye’s Region of Interest (ROI).
Finally, we can identify the iris contour using edge detection technique [97]. We
leverage the Snapdragon SDK [78] to extract eye points in our system. After
the 5th round eye tracking finishes, the Decision Maker starts to match the eye
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movement trajectory to the target’s movement trajectory. Note that the Decision
Maker only informs the user of the final match result after five rounds, and does not
inform the user about the match result for each round. A mismatch notice could
benefit the legitimate user because the user can start a new authentication early
if the current eye-tracking round fails. However, it is insecure, because it also
informs the attacker whether the guessed number in the current round is correct.
Then, the attacker just needs to try at most four times to identify the target object
in each round and 20 times to uncover the whole password.

Figure 3.4: Extract eye point from a video frame

There are two sets of eye points (left eye and right eye) whose corresponding
trajectories could be different. It could be that both trajectories match the target’s
trajectory or only one of them matches that of the target. When the user is eyetracking the target object, it is possible she peeks to another moving object because of the distraction problem. The problem could make one eye’s movement
trajectory deviate from the target’s trajectory. However, it is very hard for the user
to intentionally eye-track two different objects at the same time. So, we regard
that the user eye-tracks the target when there is at least one eye’s movement
trajectory matching the target’s movement trajectory.
We introduce six metrics to measure the similarity between the eye movement
trajectory and an object’s movement trajectory. If the eye movement trajectory is
most similar to the target’s movement trajectory, we regard it as a match. On the
other hand, if the eye movement trajectory is most similar to a non-target object’s
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movement trajectory, the authentication fails.

3.3.2.3

Measure the Similarity

After the pre-processor extracts eye points, the crucial task is how to effectively
measure the similarity between the eye movement trajectory and the target’s
movement trajectory. Assume that the screen is a rectangular coordinate system, we can refine the problem as how to measure the similarity between two
lines with directions. We expect that the user’s eye movement trajectory should
be similar to that of the moving target. The similarity is represented as that the
two trajectories’ direction should be close to each other.
In previous works [83, 86], correlation is used for matching. Principle Component Analysis (PCA) [9] is also used to estimate the direction. In this work, we
propose to fit a straight line into the eye points and compare the angle difference
between this line and the target trajectory. We adopt RANdom SAmple Consensus (RANSAC) algorithm and introduce three error functions for line fitting. Simple
Linear Regression (SLR) is another potential option for line fitting. We compare
and evaluate them with the previous methods in the evaluation part.
In the following, we present the metrics used to measure the similarity. Correlation can measure the linear association between two variables Xa and Xb in
statistics. It is defined as the covariance of the two variables divided by the product of the two variables’ standard deviations. The formula is
ρXa ,Xb =

E[(Xa − µXa )(Xb − µXb )]
σXa σXb

The coefficient is between +1 and −1, where +1 represents the total positive
correlation, 0 means no correlation, and −1 stands for the total negative correlation. The formula can calculate the correlation between two variables. However,
each eye point contains two variables X and Y coordinates. In such a case, the
correlation between eye movement and object movement has to be calculated
separately: one is for X and the other is for Y . In the previous works, the authors
claimed that if X and Y of the eye movements change with those of the object
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Algorithm 2 RANSAC algorithm with error functions
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:

Data: Eye movement points
Result: A line matches the points
BestMode1, BestMode2, BestMode3
BestMode1Score= 0
BestMode2Score = BestMode3Score = Infinity
Err1(line L): return the number of points whose distance to the line is smaller than a
threshold
Err2(line L): return the sum of distance to the line of all points
Err3(line L): return the sum of squared distance of all points
for point p1 in the set do
for another point p2 in the same set do
generate a line L based on the two points p1 and p2
if Err1(L) > BestMode1Score then
BestMode1 = L
end if
if Err2(L) < BestMode2Score then
BestMode2 = L
end if
if Err3(L) < BestMode3Score then
BestMode3 = L
end if
end for
end for
Return BestMode1, BestMode2, BestMode3

movements, the user’s eyes move following the objects. A threshold is set for
determining whether the two trajectories match.
In this work, we propose to fit a straight line into the eye points whose angle
should be close to the target’s trajectory. Four methods are used to fit a line into
the eye points. The first three are based on the RANSAC algorithm. RANSAC is
designed for removing the noise and identifying the inliers in a set. As an iterative
method, RANSAC cannot test all data points for the mathematic model exhaustively for a large set of data. However, the number of eye points is limited. Thus,
we can try all possible combinations in a short time. The algorithm is described
in Algorithm 2.
We leverage RANSAC’s idea and introduce three error functions (Err1, Err2,
Err3) in the algorithm. Err1 measures the number of points whose distance to the
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line is less than a threshold. Based on the observed data, we set the threshold to
3 pixels, implying that the line containing most points under this distance bound
is chosen as the best fitting. Err2 measures the sum of all points’ distance to
the line. Err2 chooses the line, which has the smallest sum, as the best fit. Err3
measures the sum of squared distance. The error functions 2 and 3 are similar,
but their results could be different.
All of the three error functions choose the line that is calculated from two points
in the eye point set. It is possible that a better-fit line would not pass any two points.
Therefore, we introduce another function SLR to generate the line. The function
SLR is used to fit a straight line through a set of points so that the sum of the
squared residual of the mode is as small as possible. Suppose there are n eye
points (x1 , y1 ), (x2 , y2 ), . . . , (xn , yn ). SLR will fit a straight line y = αx + β, which
provides the minimum sum of squared residues (the vertical distance from a point
to the line).
F ind
F or

Q(α, β) =

min Q(α, β)

n
∑
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i=1

The values of α and β that result in minimum Q can be computed by either using the calculus and the geometry of inner product spaces, or expanding to get
quadratic in α and β:
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ȳ)

, β = y − αx.

PCA is a statistical procedure which employs the orthogonal transformation
to convert a set of observed possibly correlated data into a group of linear uncorrelated variables called principle components. In our case, PCA is used to
estimate the direction of the set of eye points. Assume there are n eye points
(x1 , y1 ), (x2 , y2 ), . . . , (xn , yn ), the steps for PCA calculation are listed as follows:
• Calculate x′ and y ′ as: x′i = xi − x̄, yi′ = yi − ȳ.
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• Construct covariance matrix M
(

COV [x′ , x′ ] COV [x′ , y ′ ]
COV [y ′ , x′ ] COV [y ′ , y ′ ]

)

• Calculate the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the matrix. The eigenvector
of the highest eigenvalue is the principle component of the data set.
(
)
x′
• Assume the eigenvector is
. The straight line’s slope is the value of
y′
y′
.
x′

To provide a detailed view of these metrics, we conduct some preliminary experiments to measure and compare them. We deploy a preliminary eye tracking
prototype on Google Nexus 4 running Android 4.2.2. There is only one object
moving on the screen. The object’s moving distance is set as 300 pixels on the
screen. The moving speed is 200 pixels per 1000 ms. The object moves on the
screen with 45 degree. A volunteer eye-tracks the moving object for 10 times.
The gaze point is used for eye tracking in the previous work. Considering the
low resolution of front camera and the hand tremble during eye tracking, the gaze
points could be unreliable for smartphone authentication. Therefore, we utilize
eye points to identify the eye movement.
There are 10 movements corresponding to 10 sets of eye points. The average
range of eye points’ x coordinate is 19.4 ± 10.26 pixels; that of y coordinate is
7.9 ± 3.78 pixels. Figure 3.5a shows the straight lines which fit the eye points
of one movement. The x-range is 11 and y-range is 5. It is clear that the lines
generated by the five different methods can reflect the eye movement trajectory.
Figure 3.5b shows the object movement trajectory and the lines generated by
RANSAC Err2 using the 10 sets of eye points.
From this figure, we can see that the user’s eye movement basically follows
the object movement. In other words, the eye movement trajectory is similar to
the object movement trajectory. However, we also observe that the user’s eye
movement cannot strictly follow the object movement. There are three possible
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(a)

(b)

Figure 3.5: (a) The lines generated by the five functions based on one set of eye points
(b) The lines generated by one function (Err2) based on 10 sets of eye points

reasons. First, the eye tracking technique cannot guarantee 100% accuracy; second, distraction causes the user to move her eyes to a different direction; and
third, the head and hand trembles impact the eye tracking. The average correlation of the 10 set data is 0.74 ± 0.1. The value is the sum of x-coordinate’s and
y-coordinate’s correlation. Figure 3.6 depicts the angle difference between the
eye movement and the object movement. The smaller the angle difference, the
eye movement is more similar to the object movement.

3.3.3

Majority Vote

We regard that the eye movement trajectory matches the target movement trajectory if the angle difference between them is less than 45 degree. However,
the user’s eye movement trajectory could deviate more than 45 degree from the
target movement trajectory in practice. The reasons could be eye tracking’s error
or the distraction problem. Moreover, a user cannot control her eyes to move in
an exact straight line, which is just like that a user cannot draw an exact straight
line.
To tolerate these errors, we introduce the majority vote to improve detection
accuracy. The majority vote mechanism works as follows: as long as there are
any 4 successful matches within 5 rounds, we relax the matching condition (i.e.,
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Figure 3.6: The average angle dif- Figure 3.7: When there are any
ference between the trajectory of four successful matches, we relax
eye movement and that of object the match constraint for the remainmovement
der match.

the angle difference) from 45 degree to 90 degree for the deviated eye movement
trajectory.
For example, assume that the object “1” in Figure 3.7 is the target, the eye
movement trajectories in red are regarded as successful matches, since their angle difference from the target movement trajectory is less than 45 degree; however, the eye movement trajectory in green, whose angle difference is larger than
45 degree but less than 90 degree, is still classified as a successful match under the relaxed matching condition. While the matching relaxation reduces the
number of false rejections, it also increases the chance of false acceptance. Using the example above, if an attacker guesses “2” as the password and her eye
movement trajectory happens to fall into the north-west quadrant with the probability of 50%, it will be classified as a match. The similar situation exists when the
attacker guesses “3” as the password and her eye movement trajectory falls into
the north-east quadrant.
However, in the design of the majority vote, the matching relaxation happens
only if the attacker has already made four successful matches. Thus, the probability that the attacker could pass the authentication by simply guessing a password
(1+1/2+1/2)

is only C41 · C41 · C41 · C41 · C4

=

1+1/2+1/2
4×4×4×4×4
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= 0.2%.

3.4

Evaluation

We implement a prototype as an app based on Android 4.2.2. The prototype can
be integrated as an option in Android’s authentication setting. Currently, we use
the beep sound to notify a user to look back to the screen center. In a noisy environment, we could replace the beep with vibration. We leverage the Snapdragon
SDK from Qualcomm [78] to track the user’s eye movement. The snapdragon can
be deployed on many existing smartphones. It can extract the eye points in real
time. To better evaluate and analyze the results, we record eye points and object
routes into files. For future real world deployment, these functions can be easily
integrated together and the data can be analyzed in real time without writing them
into files.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed authentication method, 21 volunteers are invited to participate our user study with age range from 24 to 33.
Among them, 14 wear glasses. In the following, we first measure detection accuracy. Then we compare the performance of matching trajectories using different
metrics. Finally, we assess the security of our scheme.

3.4.1 Experimental Setup
Our experiments consist of three parts: indoor, outdoor, and mimic attacks. The
indoor experiments are conducted in a normal office environment with enough
lights. It is common that people use smartphones indoors. Unlike outdoor lights,
indoor lights remain stable as time goes on. So, indoors is the ideal environment
for accuracy evaluation. All volunteers are involved with the indoor experiments,
and each of them applies the correct password for 30 times. Users hold the smartphone in the front of their faces, and stay in a comfortable posture (either sitting
or standing). They take a short break (at least 5 seconds) between two sets of
experiments. After the indoor experiments are completed, we select five users
to do the outdoor experiments. They perform the same operations as the indoor
experiments. Two users do the outdoor experiments on a cloudy day. The other
three use the smartphone under the tree shade on a sunny day. We do outdoor
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experiments under the tree shade because users feel uncomfortable when they
look at the screen in the sun. It also results in inaccurate eye movement detection.
Finally, five users are involved in the mimic attacks for security evaluation.

3.4.2 Detection Accuracy
Detection accuracy is the key performance indicator of an authentication method.
A user could be unsatisfied if the authentication fails even when the correct password is applied. Our detection accuracy (i.e., true positive rate) is listed in Table
3.1.
Table 3.1: Accuracy of the authentication method
Users

Trials

Environment

Left eye

Right eye

21
5

630(30×21)
150(30×5)

Indoor
Outdoor

1584
336

1566
414

Detection
accuracy
77.1%
79.3%

Detection accuracy
Majority Vote
91.6%
97.3%

While using the RANSAC Err2 metric for matching, the detection accuracy of
indoor experiments is 77.1% (486/630) and that of outdoor experiments is 79.3%
(119/150). We regard that such results are reasonable, considering that neither
extra eye tracker nor calibration process is required. In the previous work [83]
that utilizes the front camera for eye gesture detection, five users were enrolled in
the user study with the smartphone fixed on the table. Its recognition rate is just
about 60%. In our evaluation, we further observe that many authentication failures only have one digit mismatch. After applying the majority vote, the detection
accuracy of indoor experiments increases to 91.6% (577/630) and that of outdoor
experiments increases to 97.3% (146/150).
Since we track the eye movement for authentication, users do not need to
keep their heads fixed during the authentication. They can take a comfortable
posture to conduct eye movements. Different postures like standing or sitting
have little impact on detection accuracy. Our method can tolerate the slight head
and hand tremble, because the eye point range is large enough for reflecting the
eye movement trajectory. The eye point ranges are shown in Figures 3.8a and
3.8b.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 3.8: The average range of eye points in indoor experiments (a) and that in outdoor
experiments (b)

As stated before, a user’s eye movement trajectory of left eye could be different
from that of right eye. We choose the one which is closer to the target movement
trajectory for matching. There are 1584 left eye movement trajectories and 1566
right eye movement trajectories being used in the evaluation. Note that we use
different eye movement data just for matching with higher accuracy. When left
eye movement data is selected, it does not mean that the right eye movement
data mismatches.
The accuracy of outdoor experiments during the daytime is close to that of indoor experiments. No matter it is sunny or cloudy, the accuracy does not change
much. Our authentication method does not work well in weak light or dark. If
there is adequate light, the number of captured eye points should be about 89.
It means that we extract eye points from 16 frames in a second. The eye point
number in weak light could be as low as 28, which corresponds to that 5 frames
are handled in a second. It is clear that the eye point number in weak light is
much less than that in normal light. This will negatively impact the line generation
and match precision. Be aware that different people have different understanding
of the weak light. Thus, we provide an approximation view on the connection between eye point number and light strength. Figure 3.9 shows the eye point number
extracted at different time of a day. We can see that in most time when a user
needs authentication, the light should be strong enough. We do not suggest to
62

use this authentication method in weak light, which could cause an authentication
failure. In such a case, the user could choose an alternative option, for example
the pattern-based authentication.
We further classify the failures into one time failure, two consecutive failures,
three consecutive failures, four and more consecutive failures. When a legitimate
user suffers a failure, she will expect to pass the authentication in the next trial.
The consecutive failures will frustrate the users. Table 3.2 demonstrates the failure statistics. There are 84 one time failures, 18 two consecutive failures, 7 three
consecutive failures, and only 1 four consecutive failures. The three and more
consecutive failures happen in a low probability. When majority vote is applied,
there are 42 one time failures, 5 two consecutive failures, and only 1 three consecutive failures.
Table 3.2: Consecutive failures statistic
No majority
vote
Number
Rate
Majority
vote
Number
Rate

One time
failure
83
13.2%
One time
failure
40
6.3%

Two
failures
36
5.7%
Two
failures
10
1.6%

Three
failures
21
3.3%
Three
failures
3
0.5%

Four and more
failures
4
0.6%
Four and more
failures
0
0%

3.4.3 Effectiveness Comparison
Correlation and PCA are used to estimate the eye movement direction in previous
works. Besides these two metrics, we further consider four additional methods
to fit a line into the eye points and compare the angle difference between the
fitted line and the target movement trajectory. Thus, in total we use six metrics
to measure the similarity between the eye movement trajectory and the target
movement trajectory. Figure 3.10 shows the average successful match number
among the 21 users.
There are 150 (5×30) comparisons in 30 sets of experiments for one user.
The correlation’s average successful match number is 129.7, which corresponds
to the match rate of 86.5%. RANSAC with error function 2 makes the largest num63

Figure 3.9: The number of eye Figure 3.10: Numbers of successpoints captured at different time
ful matches of the 6 metrics

ber of successful matches (141), and the match rate is as high as 94%. Among
the 21 users, 20 user’s RANSAC ERR2 successful match number exceeds that
of other metrics, and only 1 user’s SLR successful match number is higher than
that of RANSAC ERR2. Table 4.2 lists the overall successful match number and
the corresponding match rate for six metrics without applying the majority vote.
We note that oscillation could happen during a user’s eye movement. It means
that users’ eyes may move back, left, right, and then forward. Correlation is calculated by the eye point sequence. Such oscillation will impact the final correlation
result. However, it brings little impact on fitting a line, since all these points are still
distributed along the line. It could be a reason why fitting a line achieves higher
match rate than correlation. Through the comparison, we identify that RANSAC
ERR2 is the most effective and reliable metric for matching among the six metrics.
Table 3.3: Total match of all metrics
Number
Rate

PCA
1200
38.1%

Cor
2724
86.5%

Err1
2890
91.7%

Err2
2961
94%

Err3
2304
73.1%

SLR
2661
84.5%

3.4.4 Security Evaluation
Since our authentication method requires no hand input, it is resistant to the
smudge and keylogger attacks. We try to compromise it by mounting a shoulder
surfing attack. When a user is authenticating, an “attacker” peeks the process
64

from different angles around the user. However, the “attacker” cannot figure out
the password no matter standing in the front of the user or facing the user’s back.
In such cases, the “attacker” can only see either the objects’ movements on the
screen or eye movement. We observe that the password could be stolen only if
the “attacker” stands at a special position—the “attacker” stands very close to the
user (less in a meter) and face to the user’s one side so that the “attacker” can
make slight turns to monitor both the user’s eye movement and the objects’ movements. But the user will notice the peek easily in such a special scenario. Thus,
our authentication method can significantly reduce the vulnerability to shoulder
surfing attacks.
To further evaluate the security of our proposed scheme, we ask 5 users to
authenticate using incorrect passwords. Each user tries 15 incorrect passwords.
These passwords are divided into 5 groups, one of which contains 3 passwords.
Each password in the first group contains 0 correct digit. For example, if the
correct password is “1-4-3-1-2”, the incorrect passwords could be “2-3-1-3-1”, “31-1-2-4”, or “4-1-2-3-3”. Each password in the second group contains 1 correct
digit, each password in the third group contains 2 correct digits, and so forth.
All incorrect passwords are generated randomly. In this set of experiments, all
trails (75) fail as expected without matching relaxation. After matching relaxation
is applied, there is still no false acceptance if the number of correct digits in a
password is smaller than 4. The false acceptance could occur if an incorrect
password contains 4 correct digits. However, as we discussed in Section 3.3.3,
the false acceptance rate is merely 0.2% given that matching relaxation is active.

3.5

Discussion

To provide a comprehensive view of this work, we discuss the limitations of this
work and the potential future work in this section.
Like other applications leveraging face recognition and eye tracking techniques,
our work depends on adequate light. It cannot accurately track a user’s eyes in
weak light or dark. We try to capture eye movements by leveraging the screen
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illumination in dark; however, the eye movements cannot be recorded. One possible solution is to use the infrared detector to capture the eye movements. Unfortunately, many current smartphones have not yet equipped with the infrared
detector. We plan to explore this problem in the future.
Another limitation is that our method will cost longer time than passcode-based
and pattern-based authentication. However, eye tracking authentication methods
offer stronger security to resist those attacks discussed before. In addition, the
time of conducting our authentication method for one time is about 9.6 seconds.
It is shorter than the average time of existing works EyePIN (48.6 s) and EyePassShape (12.5 s) [18], which work with the assistance of desktop display.
When the eye points are clustered together, it is hard to tell the eye movement
direction. A simple solution to this problem is that we just fail the authentication
when either the x-range or y-range of eye points is less than a threshold. The
threshold could vary from user to user.
This work is a first step towards applying the eye tracking technique in smartphone authentication. It may not be able to satisfy all because of individual difference. But it provides smartphone users a new authentication option for lowering the risks. With the development of hardware equipped on smartphone, e.g.,
higher resolution front camera, front infrared detector or front flash light, we believe that this authentication method can achieve higher accuracy within a shorter
period.
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Chapter 4

Location Privacy Breach: Apps Are
Watching You in Background
Smartphone users can conveniently install a set of apps that provide Location
Based Service (LBS) from markets. These LBS-based apps facilitate users in
many application scenarios, but they raise concern on the breach of privacy related to location access. Smartphone users can hardly perceive location access,
especially when it happens in background. In comparison to location access in
foreground, location access in background could result in more serious privacy
breach because it can continuously know user’s locations. In this work, we study
the problem of location access in background, and especially perform the first
measurement of this background action on the Google app market. Our investigation demonstrates that many popular apps conduct location access in background within short intervals. This enables these apps to collect a user’s location
trace, from which the important personal information, Points of Interest (PoIs),
can be recognized. We further extract a user’s movement pattern from the PoIs,
and utilize it to measure the extent of privacy breach. The measurement results
also show that using the combination of movement pattern related metrics and the
other PoI related metrics can help detect the privacy breach in an earlier manner
than using either one of them alone. Finally, we propose a client side solution
for Android users to tackle the privacy breach caused by location access in back67

ground.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we survey
the related work. The statistical analysis of location access in background in the
current app market is described in Section 4.2. Then, we present the threat model,
the privacy metrics, and the measurements based on the characteristics of apps
and real location data traces in Section 4.3. We propose a client side solution and
evaluate its effectiveness in Section 4.4.

4.1

Background and Related work

In this section, we first briefly introduce the background of location access and the
protection mechanism on Android. Then, we survey the related works.

4.1.1 Background
Android manages system resources via the permission mechanism, which requires apps to declare a permission for accessing the corresponding resource.
The apps can acquire the resource only if a user grants the requested permission. Android provides two permissions, “ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION” and
“ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION”, for location access. Holding the former permission, apps can get locations with the accuracy approximately equivalent to a city
block; but the latter permission allows apps to fetch the precise location. Android
versions earlier than 5.0 requires a user to grant permissions to an app at the
beginning of installation, after which the user cannot revoke permissions from the
app except removing the app from its device. On the versions equal or later than
5.0, users can either grant or revoke a permission after the installation. In the app
market, it is common that apps access location per a user’s request, e.g., the user
asks the app Y elp to list the restaurants nearby. Also, apps can keep requesting
locations in some frequency so that they provide proper LBS in a timely manner.
They can even update location in background.
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Figure 4.1: Notification of location access

When an app attempts to access a GPS location, Android will display an icon
on its system bar, which is circled in blue at the top chart of Figure 4.1. The left
side of Figure 4.1 displays the system bar without the icon of location access. In
the middle of Figure 4.1, the location request from a running app triggers Android
to show the icon on the system bar. While the app is moved to background, the
icon continues to show up as demonstrated in the right side of Figure 4.1, as
long as the app keeps on requesting location in background. Although users can
recognize location access by checking the icon, a recent research [2] reveals that
such a prompt cannot effectively get users’ attention on location access.
Researchers have observed that releasing locations could result in privacy
breaches. For example, Golle et al. [35] showed that an adversary could infer a
user’s home address from the collected locations. However, it is hard for users
to figure out whether releasing a location is safe or not. Therefore, the permission mechanism of Android, which depends on users’ decision to work, cannot
effectively protect user’s privacy in many application scenarios, especially those
access locations in background.
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4.1.2 Related work
Many research works have revealed that collected locations can be exploited
to infer a user’s private information. Bettini et al. [13] first pointed out that the
spatial and temporal correlation could be leveraged as the quasi-identifier, with
which an adversary can infer a user’s identity from the anonymized location data.
Through analyzing a large amount of cellular records [94], Zang et al. showed
that anonymized location data still contains a user’s private information, and the
top 2 and 3 locations could yield a very small anonymous user set, leading to an
easy guess. In the work [32], the authors defined three types of locations to infer a
user’s identity. Montjoye [22] demonstrated that a few number of Spatio-Temporal
points can be used to uniquely identify most individuals. Coarsening the locations
cannot guarantee a user to be anonymized. The work [87] indicates that users
are not quite clear about the resource access from apps on Android. More than
that, users rarely recognize location access when it happens, although Android
prompts users by displaying a mark on the system bar [2].
We may not expect that the protection mechanisms of Android can handle
the risks in various emerging applications. So, researchers have proposed many
complementary solutions to address the specific problems. TaintDroid and AppFence
[27, 48] leverage the dynamic analysis technique to detect information leakage in
Android systems. Although they can prevent the location from being sent out of the
device, they cannot determine whether releasing a location to apps will cause the
privacy breach or not. MockDroid [10] first extends Android’s permission management scheme so that users can make different choices (releasing real/fake data to
an app or blocking the access from an app). As a more advanced solution, TISSA
[102] can send shadow data of several kinds of private information. Nauman et
al. [67] proposed Apex, a policy enforcement framework, to execute customized
policies of using system resources. These solutions depend on users’ decisions
to work. However, making a proper decision is not easy for users. This motivates
us to help users manage location access in background.
Previous research works present some privacy metrics and algorithms for measuring the privacy risk of releasing locations. The spatial cloaking algorithms
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[34, 37, 79] reduce the accuracy of locations to satisfy the k-anonymity constraint.
Some other algorithms [11, 43, 81] protect privacy by selectively hiding locations
at an interval or in high density areas. Hoh et al. [44, 45] proposed a different metric called time to confusion that measures the privacy according to how long an
adversary needs to track a user before identifying the user. Shokri et al. [77] presented the location information disclosure attacks, based on which they proposed
a framework to measure the performance of different Location Privacy Protection
Mechanisms (LPPMs). Entropy and k-anonymity are used as the metrics in privacy measurement. These solutions are deployed on a trust server that manages
the location data of all nearby users. They are not suitable for smartphone users,
because the trust server does not know what information the LBS provider has.
In this work, we address the problem based on the data of a single user.
There are a couple of works aiming to tackle the privacy issues of location access on Android. Micinski et al. [65] evaluated the location truncation technique
that reduces the risk of leaking a user’s privacy while apps can normally work with
them in many cases. In the work [33], the authors studied the location access of
running apps by checking whether the cached location is changed. Their method
does not apply for checking location access in background. LP-Guardian [29]
is a comprehensive solution to protect privacy from location access on Android.
For these location requests issued in background, it simply releases the coarsened location to them without considering a user’s demand on QoS. Fawaz et al.
[28] conducted the first location measurement campaign by analyzing the popular
apps. Their privacy model mainly works for those cases where apps sporadically
access location in foreground. Our work is different from the above works because
we measure the risk of location access in background based on the metrics integrated with its characteristics, and propose to address the problem by striking a
good balance between protecting privacy and guaranteeing QoS.
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4.2

Location Access in Background of Apps

On Android, only one app can run activity on the top of screen. When a user
clicks the home button or launches another app, the previous app will be moved
to background and cached so that it can be quickly switched to foreground in
the next time. Usually, apps request location per user’s request in foreground.
However, apps can also receive updates of location in background by registering
a location listener. They can even create a persistent service to continuously
update locations. Although users could be aware of the action by observing the
notification on the system bar when an app accesses location, it is very difficult
to recognize the action when it happens in background. Even worse, users may
mistake that the location access from a background app is from the foreground
app.
In comparison to location access in foreground, location access in background
happens in a more concealed manner, and can collect more locations of users.
Therefore, it could incur more serious privacy risks. Here we attempt to characterize such an action in the app market.

4.2.1 Apps source and study method
As one of the largest app markets, the Google app market provides abundant
apps that are classified in 28 categories. We conduct our measurement based on
the top 100 popular apps from every category to cover all types of apps. There
are 2,800 apk files of the apps downloaded in total. In this work, we detect location access by checking the official methods of requesting location. Note that
some apps may not request location via system API. They could parse location by
exploiting the cellular or network information. So, location access in background
in the app market could be more serious than what we have measured. The problem of detecting location access via unofficial channels is complementary to this
work.
First, we separate the apps that do not access location from the downloaded
apks. These apps do not declare permissions related to location access. We
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Figure 4.2: System dump information about location access.

extract the manifest file from the apk file by using the Apktool [5] for reverse engineering. For those apps that declare at least one permission of location access,
we manually install and operate them one by one on a real mobile device (Google
Nexus 4 smartphone with Android 4.4 running on it). We launch the app, try to
trigger location access, move the app to background, and finally close it. We use
a system diagnostic tool “dumpsys” [26] to examine how apps request location.
The output of “dumpsys” informs which app is accessing the location, what location provider is registered and how frequently the app requests location. Take the
first entry shown in Figure 4.2 as an example, the app whose package name is
“com.mapmyfitness.android2” requests location from a GPS provider at the frequency of one request per second.

4.2.2 Statistics of the location access
The granularity of location and the frequency of location access directly impact
the accuracy and amount of locations that an app can collect. Intuitively, the finer
the granularity and the higher the frequency, the more information an app can
get. It implies that an adversary has higher possibility to breach a user’s privacy.
Thus, we mainly observe these two factors of the action (i.e., location access in
background) in the measurement.
Overall, there are 1,137 out of 2,800 apps declare at least one permission for
location access. As shown in Figure 4.3, among the 1,137 apps, 17% of them only
declare the permission of “ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION” and 16% of them just declare the permission of “ACCESS_COARSE_LO-CATION”. A majority of the apps
(67%) declare both permissions. Those apps, which claim to access fine location,
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Table 4.1: Usage of location provider
Location
providers
Granularity
Fine
Coarse
Fine & Coarse

gps

network

passive

gps
network

gps
passive

network
passive

gps network
passive

fused
network

7
0
32

3
0
9

4
6
7

2
0
14

0
0
5

1
0
4

1
0
6

0
0
1

can get locations at either fine or coarse granularity. Android provides four types
of location providers: GPS, network, passive, and fused. The first two return fine
and coarse locations, respectively. The passive provider allows apps to get the
cached location that will be updated if an app requests a new location. Requesting cached location will not induce any extra overhead for location calculation.
The fused provider is an interface of Google play service that provides all types of
locations to apps. In a real environment, apps may not mean to access location
even if they have declared the permission for location access, due to the widely
existing problem known as over-privilege [30]. We observe that 528 out of the
1,137 apps function to access location, in which 393 apps automatically start to
request location right after they are launched. For the other 135 apps, we trigger
the location requests as a normal user.

Figure 4.3: Permission claimed by apps.

In many cases, apps access location per user’s request. However, there exists location access in background that can hardly be perceived by users. Among
the 528 apps that function to access location, 102 out of them (19.3%) will access
location in background. Among the 102 apps, 85 apps automatically request location right after they are launched.
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Then we investigate the two factors that can lead to the privacy breach to different extents. The first factor depends on the location providers that the apps use.
Table 4.1 lists the granularity (fine, coarse) of location requested by the apps in
manifest files and the location providers (GPS, network, passive, fused) actually
used by the apps. There are 96 apps (94.12%) claiming to access fine location,
and only 6 apps claiming to access coarse location. However, there exist the
cases in which apps do not function as what they claim to do. Our observation
shows that 28 (27.5%) apps access coarse location during usage while they claim
to access fine location. Meanwhile, we also observe 68 apps (a significant proportion 66.7% of them) access precise location. Considering we may miss some
execution paths that can trigger requesting fine location, the above percentage
number could be even higher. The coarse locations do not contain much important personal information about the user’s privacy. In comparison to releasing
coarse location, releasing precise location will incur higher risk of privacy leakage.
For example, a precise location could reveal the clinic where a user visits, yet a
coarse location will not expose such PoIs of the user. Some previous solutions
have used coarse locations to prevent a user’s PoIs from being identified [29, 65].
The other factor is the frequency of updating location. For the apps that access location in background, most of them frequently update locations. As shown
in Figure 4.4, 57.8% of the apps update location within every 10 seconds, 68.6%
of them do it within every 60 seconds, and 83.8% of the apps keep the location
to be updated within every 600 seconds. The largest interval between two location accesses is 7,200 seconds. Only one app requests to update location in that
frequency. Releasing location in high frequency enables the app to collect the
location trace of a user. The higher the frequency, the more complete the trace
is. Usually a complete trace contains much more useful information than an incomplete one. For instance, according to a complete location trace, we can find
out the places where a user has stayed for a while. However, using an incomplete
location trace, we cannot figure out such places but only know the locations where
the user has been. In the next section, we will quantify the potential privacy risk
with the change of the frequency.
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Figure 4.4: Cumulative distribution function of location request frequency by apps.

4.3

The privacy model and evaluation

LBS providers can keep the collected location information of users. Even if these
information is anonymized by the providers, a third party is still able to restore
some private information from the data [94], e.g., inferring a user’s identity. In
this section, we present our threat model, the privacy metrics that can be used to
quantify the privacy risk of a location request, and the risk measurements based
on these metrics.

4.3.1 Threat model
In our threat model, the adversary is not a malicious entity that aims to exploit the
security vulnerabilities of Android systems to steal a user’s private information.
Instead, it could be any third party, which possesses some of a user’s location
information, and attempt to infer more private and valuable information so that it
can provide a customized service [28, 29]. Either an LBS provider or any third
party could be such a entity if it fits the description above. The app deployed on a
user’s mobile device will collect location traces and send them to LBS providers.
Then, the third party could get the anonymized data from LBS providers. The
adversary could use various methods to infer the user’s private information from
the collected location traces. Our assessment of the privacy risk is not based
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on the specific methods that the adversary uses to infer a user’s private information. Instead, we measure the privacy risk in terms of how the released locations
demonstrate the PoIs of a user. Intuitively, the more complete location trace the
adversary can acquire, the more accurate PoIs of a user can be extracted from
the trace.

4.3.2 Privacy metrics
A user’s privacy can be protected by simply rejecting all location requests from the
background apps. In the work [29], apps will receive coarsened locations if they
request locations in background. This method can prevent a user’s privacy from
being leaked, however, it can hardly satisfy a user’s demand on the quality of LBS.
To draw a proper line between protecting a user’s privacy and guaranteeing the
QoS, we need to determine whether releasing a location to an app in background
is safe or not. In our design, a location may release to a request from background
only if it can pass some test criteria known as privacy metrics.
Table 4.2 lists the four privacy metrics that we use to measure the potential
risks. PoIs represent the places where users are interested in and involve some
daily activities. They are very important private information since an adversary
could infer a user’s identity from them. The work [35] shows that adversaries can
identify users according to the pair of ⟨home, work⟩ locations. Some PoIs may
contain sensitive information of a user, which may bring more serious information
leakage. For example, the adversary could infer the user’s health status by analyzing the clinic where the user often visits. The adversary may find out the user’s
preference of politics or religions from the PoIs as well. We use two well-known
PoI related metrics [28], P oItotal and P oIsensitive , to measure the risk in this work.
The former metric means the total PoIs extracted by the adversary from the collected locations, while the latter metric represents the sensitive PoIs. We count
those PoIs where users have visited for multiple times as sensitive PoIs, since
those places could contain more private and sensitive information [28, 36, 42].
The location requests from foreground often happen when users stop somewhere and operate the apps. Therefore, the locations collected by foreground
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Table 4.2: Metrics used to measure and quantify the risk.
Metric
P oItotal
P oIsensitive
Hisbin
Deganonymity

Description
The fraction of PoIs
The fraction of user’s infrequent visited PoIs
Whether the histograms of collected data fits the profile
The degree of anonymity

apps only represent those places where users have shown up, but not always be
the PoIs. In addition, the locations collected by foreground apps are usually discrete locations, which lack of the connection between any two of them. Differently,
apps running in background frequently request to update locations according to
our observations. The apps requesting location in high frequency could have a
complete location trace of a user. An adversary can use the trace to identify the
places where users have stayed for some time. Also, they can infer more information based on the connection between two PoIs. Generally, it would be more
secure if the adversary cannot access the locations of sensitive PoIs and the locations of other PoIs as few as possible.
We adopt the idea of Spatio-Temporal algorithm to extract PoIs from location
traces. In the algorithm, we regard every location as a point that contains the
latitude, longitude, and time-stamp. We define three buffers bufEntry , bufP oI , and
bufExit , which accommodate the locations possibly belonging to the PoI. Each
buffer has a centroid that is calculated by averaging the latitude and longitude of
all points in the buffer. The bufEntry represents the area where a user starts to
enter a PoI. The bufP oI accommodates all the points belonging to the PoI. The
second half of bufEntry overlaps with the beginning of bufP oI . In other words, the
two buffers have an overlapped area whose size is the half of bufEntry . The bufExit
represents the area where a user starts to exit from the PoI. Similarly, bufP oI and
bufExit have an overlapped area. We fill the three buffers in sequence. For every
new arrival point, we update the centroid of its buffer, which is used to calculate the
distance between two buffers. When the distance between bufEntry and bufP oI is
less than a threshold, we regard the user has entered in a PoI. When the distance
between bufP oI and bufExit is larger than the threshold, we regard that the user
starts to exit the PoI. The algorithm runs in linear time, and thus it is suitable for
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Algorithm 3 Algorithm of extracting PoIs
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:

Input: locations in trace p1 , p2 , · · · , pn
for i = 1 → n do
if f illBuf s(bufEntry , bufP oI , bufExit ) then
continue;
end if
if dist(centerEntry, centerP oI) < thresh then
if dist(centerP oI, centerExit) < thresh then
bufP oI ← headOf (bufExit );
bufExit ← pi ;
else
recordP oI();
clearBuf s();
end if
else
bufEntry ← headOf (bufP oI );
bufP oI ← headOf (bufExit );
bufExit ← pi ;
dequeues(bufEntry , bufP oI , bufExit );
end if
end for

mobile platforms whose computing and power resources are limited. The pseudo
code is shown in Algorithm3.
Users can block the access to sensitive locations. However, an adversary is
still able to infer the important information of users from the other PoIs. In this
work, we consider how to prevent the adversary from inferring the movement pattern of users. We use the metric Hisbin to test whether releasing a location will incur the leakage of user’s privacy or not. While the distribution of visits can uniquely
identify a user [94, 28], the connection between two PoIs could also distinguish
a user from the others. This is because people may demonstrate different movement patterns when visiting a group of locations. Assume that a set of users have
visited (P oIi , P oIj , P oIk ), some of them are used to moving from P oIi to P oIk ,
but some others may prefer to moving from P oIj to P oIk . Such a pattern, as a
quasi-identifier [13], can be used to identify a small anonymity set. So, we take
the movement pattern into account for risk detection. We create the histograms,
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which contain the movement pattern (P oIi → P oIj ) as the key and the number of
times it happens as the value, to represent the user’s profile. The first histogram
is created from the complete location trace of a user as the ground truth, and the
second one is generated based on the collected locations. If the two histograms
match well with each other, the collected locations by the apps will indicate the
user’s activity profile, and thus, the released locations will result in the leakage of
a user’s privacy
We use Pearson’s Chi-square goodness of fit test [49] to decide the result of
match. Assume that a user moves following a path as P = p1 , p2 , . . . , pi , . . . , pn ,
where pi represents a PoI of the user. We create the histogram with items ((pi , pj ), cij )),
where (pi , pj ) means that the user moves from pi to pj , and cij means the number
of times the user has moved from pi to pj . In our context, the statistic test is shown
in Formula 4.1,
|P a|
∑
cij − eij
χ =
eij
i=1
2

(4.1)

where eij as the expected number represents the number of times the movement
pattern (i → j) happens in the user’s profile, and cij represents the observed
number from the collected data. The statistics converge with the degree |P a| − 1
when the null hypothesis holds. We test the lower tail of Chi-square statistic,
where the null hypothesis can be rejected, if the returned p-value is smaller than a
threshold. In such a case, it means that the histogram from the collected data does
not match that of the profile. We set Hisbin = 0. Otherwise, the two histograms
are similar, which means releasing the location is unsecure. We set Hisbin = 1.
We further measure the information leakage from the adversary’s perspective.
The adversary may has acquired multiple users’ location data, as the profiles,
from various sources [35]. When the adversary newly receives data from a user,
he could compare the data to the profiles for inferring the user’s identity. Such
information leakage can be measured by entropy [44, 23], which reflects the degree of anonymity. Assume that the adversary tries to infer the identity of a user
by comparing the user’s data to the profiles collected previously. Let X be the dis80

crete random variable with the probability mass function pi = P r(X = i), where
X represents a user and pi is the corresponding probability that the adversary
knows the user could be the ith one. The probabilities are calculated according
to the result of Chi-square test. Assume that the user’s data matches the profiles
of five users in Chi-square test. In other words, χ21 , χ22 , χ23 , χ24 , χ25 are larger than
the threshold value in the test. The probability, of which the user could be the ith
one, is calculated as the following Formula 4.2.
pi =

χ2i
χ21 + χ22 + χ23 + χ24 + χ25

(4.2)

Then, the entropy after the inference attack is calculated by Formula 4.3.
H(X) = −

∑

pi log2 (pi )

(4.3)

Let HM be the max entropy. The actual size of the anonymity set is calculated in
Formula 4.4,
H(M ) = log2 (N )

(4.4)

where N is the number of those profiles that the adversary possesses. The information that the adversary traces out after the inference is calculated by H(M ) −
H(X). Finally, we need to divide the difference by H(M ) for normalization, and
the degree of anonymity is expressed in Formula 4.5.
Deganonymity = 1 −

H(M ) − H(X)
H(X)
=
H(M )
H(M )

(4.5)

A smaller degree means a more serious information leakage. The degree equals
zero if the received data matches only one profile. In such a case, the adversary
knows that the data belongs to the user. On the other hand, the equal probabilities
bring the adversary the max anonymity set. In such a case, the entropy equals
one, and releasing the location does not expose a user’s identity to the adversary.
Note that the entropy is not used to detect the privacy risk for users but measure
81

Table 4.3: Parameters set for extracting algorithm.
Set ID
Visiting time (min)
Radius (m)

1
10
50

2
20
50

3
30
50

4
10
100

5
20
100

6
30
100

the seriousness of information leakage.

4.3.3 Measurement of the potential risks
We measure the potential risks caused by location access by using the metrics
above. The measurement is conducted using the real location traces of Geolife
project [101]. The dataset contains the GPS locations from 182 users. There
are 17,621 trajectories covering a distance of about 1.2 million kilometers. Each
entry in the dataset contains time-stamp, latitude, and longitude. About 91% of
the location traces are recorded in high frequency, e.g., every 1 to 5 seconds. The
dataset mainly records users’ outdoor activities, including going home, shopping,
sightseeing, dining, and etc. The dataset fits well for analyzing the risks caused
by continuous location accesses, especially when they happen in high frequency.
The interval between two consecutive locations is just one second in most cases.
Thus, the original location trace is fine-grained enough to be used as the ground
truth in the measurement.
600s
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Figure 4.5: PoIs extracted under different parameters

First, we measure the two PoI related metrics, P oItotal and P oIsensitive , accord82

ing to different values of radius and visiting time. As shown in Table 4.3, we set
the radius to 50 or 100 meters, and the visiting time to 10, 20, or 30 minutes. Figure 4.5 shows the number of PoIs extracted under the different combinations of
the parameters. Under the same radius, the amount of PoIs decrease while the
visiting time increases. This is because a short visiting period can be fulfilled more
easily compared to a long visiting period during the PoI extraction. Similarly, the
larger the radius, the more PoIs can be extracted under the same visiting time.
Overall, the impact of the radius is not as significant as that of the visiting time. We
choose the first set of parameters for our measurements, since a large number of
PoIs can well describe the movement habituations of users.
Then, we show how the access frequency impacts the two metrics in Figure
4.6. Generally, higher frequency access allows apps to collect more complete
location traces, from which we can extract more PoIs. Figure 4.6 (a) shows that
9,061 PoIs are extracted from the location trace collected under the frequency of
one access per second. As the frequency decreases, the number of PoIs drops
as well. When the interval between two location accesses is smaller than 10 seconds, there is little difference in PoI extraction. However, if the interval increases
to 7,200 seconds, only around 1.8% PoIs can be extracted. Figure 4.6 (c) indicates that about 45.1% of apps can acquire all PoIs of users.
Similarly, the access frequency also impacts the extraction of sensitive PoIs.
In the measurement, we consider those PoIs that users have visited for no more
than 3 times as sensitive PoIs. Figure 4.6 (b) shows that the numbers of the
three types of sensitive PoIs are reduced when the frequency of location access
decreases. Figures 4.6 (d), (e) and (f) demonstrate that 45.1% of apps can trace
out all sensitive PoIs. In short, a large proportion of the apps (more than 45%),
which frequently update location in background, can lead to the exposure of PoIs.
In what follows, we measure the third metric Hisbin according to the following
two patterns. The first pattern ⟨region, visited times⟩ used in previous work is
marked as “pattern 1”, and the second one ⟨movement pattern, happen times⟩
is marked as “pattern 2”. A risk is detected when the collected data passes the
Chi-square test and fits the user’s profile well. We set the threshold p-value to a
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Figure 4.6: (a) The number of P oItotal changes with the access frequency. (b) The number of P oIpart changes with different frequency. (c) The distribution of apps that extract
different proportion of the total PoIs. (d) Sensitive PoIs with visiting times = 1, 2 (e), and
3 (f).

widely used one, 0.05.
The measurement results are shown in Figure 4.7. Figure 4.7 (a) illustrates
how fast the risk is detected when an app accesses location per second from the
beginning of the location trace. For around 52% of users, pattern 2 helps to detect
the risk when the collected locations are fewer than 10% of the profiles. However,
pattern 1 only detects the risk for about 13% of users under the same condition.
We conduct further measurement by collecting the random positions in the location traces. Figure 4.7 (b) demonstrates that pattern 2 still outperforms pattern
1. The reason is that pattern 2 describes the habituation of a user’s movement,
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Figure 4.7: (a) How many locations are needed for identification from the start point, (b)
start from a random position of the traces, (c) the number of detection changes with the
access frequency, and (d) the performance of the two patterns varies with the access
frequency.

which helps quickly match the two histograms. Specifically, pattern 2 could yield a
smaller critical value and a higher degree in the Chi-square test, which contribute
to the faster detection.
Moreover, we observe how access frequency impacts the risk detection. The
y-axis of Figure 4.7 (c) represents the number of users, in whose location data the
risks are detected. When one location access happens per second, both patterns
detect risks for 107 users. When apps access locations in high frequency, they
can collect complete location traces, which profile the users well. By contrast, if
apps conduct the action in low frequency, they can only collect incomplete location traces. Therefore, the number of users drops with the decrease of access
frequency. Although both patterns detect risks for the similar numbers of users,
pattern 2 can detect the risk faster than pattern 1. Figure 4.7 (d) shows that pattern
2 achieves faster risk detection for 71 users, while pattern 1 outperforms pattern
2 only for 14 users. With the decrease of access frequency, the performance of
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both patterns degrades due to the incomplete location data.
At last, the measurement results of entropy are illustrated in Figure 4.9 (a).
A smaller entropy value represents more serious information leakage. When the
frequency is one access per second, pattern 2 leads to more serious information
leakage for 54 users, while pattern 1 incurs more serious privacy problem for 38
users. Similar to the measurement results of metric Hisbin , pattern 2 outperforms
pattern 1 when the access location frequency is high, and their performance will
degrade with the decrease of access frequency.
In summary, pattern 2 outperforms pattern 1 in the majority of the cases when
apps access location in high frequency. Meanwhile, there are some cases in
which pattern 1 outperforms pattern 2. Thus, we could combine both patterns for
better results. Specifically, we can measure the privacy with both patterns and
issue an alert when either of them detects the risk.

4.4

Defense

In this section, we present a defensive solution to alleviate the privacy risk incurred by location access from background. Instead of simply blocking all location
requests from background, we consider to strike a balance between protecting a
user’s privacy and guaranteeing the QoS. The idea of our solution is straightforward: if releasing a location could incur information leakage, we return a coarsened location to the app. Otherwise, the precise location will be released. Our
security policy of releasing a location is based on the privacy metrics described in
Section 4.3.

4.4.1 Architecture
Our client side solution consists of five components, action detector, monitor, location manager, profile manager, and decision maker. The architecture of our
solution is shown in Figure 4.8. In what follows, we describe them in details.
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Figure 4.8: The architecture of the solution.

The Action Detector checks location access in background from apps. The
standard method detects location access by monitoring a call of system API of
location access, which requires implementation at the system level. We prefer not
to make any changes at the system level so that the solution can be deployed on
the unrooted devices. The adb technique can help to avoid making such changes
[58]. We detect a location access based on the system dump information, which is
generated by running the command “adb shell dumpsys location”. This operation
just requires the “Internet” permission that is widely viewed as a non-sensitive
permission. We implement this component as a native daemon service, and run
it in background for dynamically detecting location access from apps. The latest
dump information will be sent to the component Monitor.
Once receiving the information from Action Detector, Monitor starts to parse
the dump information by extracting the app’s package name, the location provider,
and the frequency of location updates. Then, it tries to figure out whether the app
is running in background. Since Android allows only one app to run in foreground,
Monitor can find it out by comparing its name to the package name of the foreground app. If their names are different, the app must update the location in background. In such a case, Monitor sends the app’s information to Profile Manager
for recording. Monitor asks Location Manager to get the current location accord87

ing to the location access interval. Once Monitor gets a new location, it will send
the location to Decision Maker to determine whether releasing the location is safe
or not.
Decision Maker determines not to release real locations in two cases. In the
first case, sensitive locations will not be released. If a location belongs to a user’s
sensitive PoIs, it will not be released. Instead, Decision Maker will notify Location
Manager to return a coarsened location. In the second case, Decision Maker
determines not to release a location, if the location belongs to a PoI that can make
the app’s profile pass the Chi-square test. To achieve such a goal, Decision Maker
will update the profile of the app with the new PoI, and calculate the privacy metric
Hisbin . If a risk is detected (Hisbin = 1), Decision Maker asks Location Manager
to release a coarsened location. Otherwise, the real location will be released, and
Profile Manager will update the app’s profile with the new PoI.
Profile Manager maintains the profiles of a user’s movement pattern, PoIs that
apps collected, and sensitive PoIs. Profile Manager marks the apps, which show
up in the latest dump information, with active status. If some of them disappear
from the dump information later on, these apps will be marked as inactive. We
store their profiles for future detection. When a real location is released to an app,
Profile Manager will update the profile of the app with the new location.
Location Manager gets location with the smallest location request interval,
which is stored in Profile Manager. It follows the instruction from Decision Maker
to manage location release. If Decision Maker indicates that releasing a real location is unsafe, it will coarsens the current location to the city block level and
return the location via the Mock Location Provider that is provided by Android.
The implementation of this function requires no change at the system level. The
coarsened location can well protect a user’s PoI from being acquired by apps, and
it can also satisfy the user’s QoS demand in many cases [65].

4.4.2 Evaluation
We implement a prototype based on Android 4.4, then launch it on a Google nexus
4 smartphone that equips with Quad-core CPU 1,500 MHz, GPS and network
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Figure 4.9: (a) Comparison of entropy. (b) The percentage of coarsened locations. (c).
The average percentage of coarsened locations under different intervals. (d) How many
users have the better QoS under different intervals.

location provider and 2048M memory. We ensure that it can successfully detect
the location access from background and all components work well per design
criterion. Then, we use the location traces of Geolife to evaluate our proposed
solution.
The evaluation results are shown in Figure 4.9. Our solution allows a background app to get the precise location if releasing the location can pass the test.
Compared to the method that returns coarsened locations to all requests from
background, our solution can improve the QoS. We evaluate the scenario where
apps request locations every second. In such a case, our solution will coarsen as
many locations as possible to prevent the apps from having a complete location
trace. Figure 4.9(b) shows the percentage of locations being coarsened. We observe that both patterns greatly improve the QoS. For about 65% to 70% of users,
fewer than 20% of locations will be coarsened before sent to the apps. The QoS
improvement of pattern 1 is slightly higher than that of pattern 2, because it detects
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fewer privacy risks than pattern 2. Then, we investigate how our solution impacts
the QoS under different access frequencies. Location access in high frequency
could incur more serious risk of information leakage. Conversely, the risk will be
alleviated with the decrease of access frequency. As a consequence, our solution will return real locations to more requests. As shown in Figure 4.9(c), when
the intervals between location requests are shorter than 10 seconds, there is little
difference on the processing of these requests. When the interval increases to
more than 100 seconds, the average percentage of requests that receive coarsened locations drops significantly. In such a case, pattern 1 can achieve more
QoS improvement than pattern 2 in most of times. The improvement of pattern 1
will approach to that of pattern 2, when the frequency is low. As shown in Figure
4.9(d), the improvements from both patterns are very close each other at the tail
of the curves.
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Chapter 5

Conclusion
Smartphone is playing a significant role in our daily lives. As emerging challenges
always accompany new technologies, we have to face the power saving and privacy protection issues that occur in mobile applications. In this dissertation, we
first study 802.11 PSM contention problem, and propose a new packet scheduling
algorithm to help the “poor” clients save power. Second, we investigate the feasibility of applying eye tracking techniques in user authentication, and demonstrate
that the new authentication method is resistant to attacks aiming at traditional
user authentication schemes. Thirdly, we measure the potential privacy leakage
of location access in background, and provide a preliminary solution to strike a
balance between privacy protection and QoS. In what follows, we present the
detailed conclusions of the three works, respectively.
The PSM traffic contention has negative impact on PSM’s performance. It
causes a PSM client consuming little link resource to suffer from lower energy
efficiency than a PSM client consuming much link resource. In the first work,
we introduce an energy conserving model for tackling the PSM traffic contention
problem. We show that optimizing energy conserving for multiple PSM clients is
an NP-Complete problem. Then, we propose a new mechanism called HPSM
to appropriately handle PSM traffic contention and address the unfairness problem among multiple PSM clients. We define the PSM client’s battery as private
resource and the link resource as public resource. HPSM classifies a client as
poor or rich based on the link resource it consumes, and then endows the poor
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clients with higher priority over the rich clients on receiving packets. To validate
the efficacy of HPSM, we develop a prototype of HPSM and conduct a series of
experiments. Our experimental results show that HPSM helps the poor client save
about 25% power when it faces the contention from the rich clients. In addition,
its network performances like latency and packet re-transmission rate are also
significantly improved.
In the second work, we propose an eye tracking authentication method for
smartphone users. Unlike conventional user authentication on a smartphone, our
scheme only needs a user to track a moving target on the screen through eyes.
Thus, it is resistant to shoulder surfing attack, smudge attack, and many other
attacks that infer a user’s password based on the hand input information. In our
design, the moving pattern consists of four basic strokes to reduce distraction as
much as possible. Meanwhile, the object movement route is randomly changed
to lower the risk of password leakage. We introduce six different metrics to measure the similarity between the eye movement trajectory and the target movement
trajectory, and identify the most effective metric for development. To validate the
efficacy of the proposed authentication approach, we implement a prototype on
Android and conduct a user study with the help of 21 volunteers. The evaluation
results show that our authentication method is able to achieve high accuracy.
Smartphone users rarely notice a location access from background, and are
unaware of the privacy risks posed by such an action. As one of the most popular
mobile OSes, Android fails to handle this issue well as its permission mechanism
relies on a user’s decision. In the third work, we perform the first measurement
study on location access from background in the Google app market. Our measurements show that many popular apps conduct location access in background.
The frequency of location requests is highly related to the potential risk of privacy
breach. Based on the real location traces, we demonstrate how the frequency of
location requests impact a user’s privacy. Based on the privacy metrics, we propose a solution to help users detect and manage this action. Our solution is easy
for deployment, and strikes a good balance between protecting a user’s privacy
and maintaining the QoS of LBS.
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